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SOUTH aFHICAN ATTITUDES TO THE 
IA~ENDING CHISIS IN EUROPE 
The rise of Adolf Hitler in the 1930's and his 
milit~rization of Germany was noted with concern among the 
powers. M.any onlookers felt "'Ghat the 'J:reaty of Verst:l.illes 
after the First Worlu War, had cont~ined within it ~he seeds 
of conflict, If not ~ justiIict:l.tion for Hitler's aggressive 
encroachment, the h~rshne~s of Versailles was, at leas~ in the 
eyes of some, an explanation of the new German ebullience. In 
some ways Hitler cert=inly seemed to be the saviour of the 
crushed and humiliated Germany. The critical economic situation 
had been ~lleviated, unemployment greatly reduced, and the 
German people seemed to have a new sense of purpose. When 
Hitler began to rearm, and with the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland launched Germany on a course of aggression, observers 
began to note that a menace to peace was fast growing. However, 
and the story is too well-known to elaborate, it took a very 
long time for the scales to fall from the eyes of statesmen the 
world over. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that they 
could see what was happening, but were powerless, in view of the 
enfeebled condition of the League of Nations, to do anything to 
halt Germany's infringements of the Treaty of Versailles. As 
late as 1938 Neville Chamberlain was still attempt~ to appease 
Hitler and saying that in his opinion the > Fuhrer was a man to be 
trusted. 
So, if in South Africa, there were still those to whom 
Hitler was a man of destiny, redressing the wrongs created by 
Versailles, they were not alone in their belief. Looking back, 
with the advantage of thirty years of hindsight, it is easy to 
say that the writing was on the wall, but in the thirties the 
thoughts of a second holocaust so relatively soon after the first 
must have been a thought to be pushed to the recesses of the 
mind. Hence the mistaken optimism of the Great Powers, or 
perhaps a better term> would be their anxious optimism. 
General J.C. Smuts, who was to be one of the major 
protagonists in the drama to be enacted in South Africa over the 
vexed question of neutrality, had not at first realised that 
Hitler's policy meant inevitable conflict. However by 1939 he" 











Africa for participation. 
South Africa, although not a populous country, was 
strong in tenus of resources. Strategically too, she was a 
factor to be considered in time of war, since any closing of the 
Suez Canal meant that the Cape would become, as of yore, of 
l)rime importance, On the doorstep of the Union was South West 
Africa, a former German colony and now a mandate under the 
guardianship of South Africa. For this reason also, any 
decision regarding entry or non-entry into a war against Germany 
enhanced the linportance of the Union. 
A member of the British COllua.onweal til, South Africa, along 
with the other TIominions, had been granted fu~l autonomy by the 
Statute of Westminster. Interestingly enough, it was Smuts who 
was one of the first to conceive of the British Empire as a 
Commonwealth of Nations, linked by conua.on traditions, values 9.ud 
loyalty, but otherwise free and illdependent. In South Africa 
this was a sacred bond to some and an irlcso:-ne halter to others. 
~or in this country, the connection with the British had by no 
means been a peaceful evolution. The bitterness of the Great 
Trek, the Anglo-Boer War and the annexations of the Boer 
Republics still rankled in the he3..rts of Afrikaners, and Jaade 
the continuing link with Britain a const:?,nt source of irri ta tion. 
The suspician and hatred of Britain extended to include English-
speaking South Africans. Nostalgic republicanism was utilized Q~ 
politicians in. th.e stru.ggle for the preservatiorl of the 
:\frikaner way of life. 
A further cause of dish'1.t"llOny between the tW? white 
grou:..os Ll South Africa W'3.8 the fact that while the Afrifcaner 
was nUJnerica-:.ly stronger, the English-spe:3.king South Africans 
predominated in terms of economic influence. The I, English" , 
along with the Jews, were seen as capitalists, growing fat on 
the resources of a land which the Afrikaner h8.d tried, vii th a 
fierce llnd demanding love, to :llake his ovm. In the T!'irst 
World War, South Africa h:'td gone in, if not as a matter of 
course, theiL with fewer constitutional niceties to complicate 
the issue. The revulsion among certain Afrikaners at the 
thought of fighting England's war had. then culminated in a 
rebellion. By 1939, the Statute of Westminster had ;nade the 
Union's entry into aI/Jar against Germany a lln.tter of choice, not 











The Afrikaner had by no means lost his animosity towards 
Britain, and many English-speaking people still felt the 
same strong pull to help the mother-count~. This time 
however, the eventual decision was to break up a government 
and split a political party and a nation from top to bottom. 
o 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The Fusion government had come into being in 1933-34. 
It might be described as a marriage of convenience, since 
without the support of Smuts's South African Party, General 
Hertzog could never have succeeded in passing his native 
legislation, and only by joining with Hertzog's Nationalists 
could the South African Party one. again have a share in the 
exercise of political power. Fusion however, w~s more than 
just a move in practical politics. It represented at its 
highest level a genuine attempt to overcome the age-old 
divisions in South Africa. The healing of the breach between 
the two main white groups in South Africa was indeed a worthy 
aim with the shining prospect of a truly united South Africa as 
its culmination. History has recorded that up to the present 
day this has not been achieved. The Fusion government failed 
and since then there has been no other such experiment for unity. 
The neutrality crisis was the immediate cause of the 
disintegration, but if the war preCipitated by the crisis in 
1939 had not arisen, it is a matter of speculation as to whether 
the stresses and strains within the Fusion government could have 
been overcome. That there was internal strife is certain, and 
Fusion has been described as an uneasy partnership from the 
outset. However, there was, if only for a brief period, a 
s~nse of national stability under the Fusion government. 
Prosperity continued, the native question, if not resolved was 
at least less of a burning issue than previously and men of 
different political faiths were co-operating - working 
imperfectly perhaps, but nevertheless together; that in itself 
was an advance. 
General Smuts was optimistic at first, but it seems that 
he was never fully taken into Hertzog's confidence. In spite 
of playing second fiddle, Smuts nevertheless considered the 
effort worthwhile. There were others with a far more critical 
attitude. G.D. Scholtz, Afrikaner historian and biographer of , 
Dr. Nicholaas Johannes van der Merwe, the leader of the Free Stat 











setting Afrikaner against Afrikaner, and he avers that this 
was the view of his subject. l Both felt that all Afrikaners 
had the same basic material and spiritual values and that the 
Briton and the Jew had come between them. According to Scholtz,! 
Hertzog had fondly imagined that he was taking a majority of 
Nationalists into the United Party with him, when in fact only 
a minority followed his lead. He also asserts that it was 
Smuts who was really in control. One doubts the veracity of 
this, however, in view of statements by Hancock and others that 
Hertzog kept the affairs of government in his own hands, 
particularly in the sphere of foreign policy. Proximity to 
Hertzog did not mean intimacy, and Smuts had to resort to his 
own considerable private contacts for the information he sought. 
Bertha Solomon, who was a backbencher in Parliament at 
this time, had this to say of ~usion: 
"Ever since I had entered parliament and had 
been admitted to the party caucus, I had sadly 
seen that the great e ~eriment of Fusion was not 
all that I had hoped for. I had noted that 
despite the United Party's large majority in 
Parliament, and the general determinatioll of 
both parties to make it work, there was unease. 
This unease, it seemed to me, sprang largely 
from General Hertzog's autocratic attitude. 
Char.ming and courteous in ordinary life, he 
regarded any differences of opinion with him 
in the caucus as disloyalty."2 
It seems that she was not alone in criticism of the autocratic 
manners of General Hertzog. 
"General Smuts and General Hertzog were about 
as happy in harness as a horse and a zebra, 
and, as with increasing age the Prime Minister, 
who had had fifteen years in office became more 
autocratic and touchy, the Deputy Prime Minister, 
much of an age with him, but far younger in mind, 
had much to swallow in the interests of unity."3 
1. G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe, 
1888 - 1940, Joha(,nesburg, 1944, p. 293. 
2. B. Solomon, Time Remembered, Cape Town, 1968, pp. 131 - 132. 
3. review of the the 











J.R. Hofmeyr would' have concurred with the final 
statement. He felt that Smuts was sacrificing his principles 
in order to keep Fusion from crumbling. However, as Hancock 
pOints out, the concessions were rather larger in appearance 
than they were in reality.4 Hofmeyr, of course, was referring 
in particular to non-European questions, but in fact Smuts 
supported Hofmeyr's efforts in obtaining the passage of the 
Children's Act of 1937, which was beneficial for all children 
regardless of race, and in his capacity as Acting Minister of 
Native Affairs, he acted tolerantly and creditably in dealing 
with the African riot in Vereeniging during which some policemen 
were killed. Vari.ous anti-Indian Bills which had been in 
progress had beer] withdrawn, and Mr. Justice Feetham entrusted 
with the task of investigating the grounds on which these bills 
were based. So it seems that Smuts would not have felt too 
many pangs of conscience at this time over the non-European 
question. However it must be admitted that, in a broad survey 
of Smuts' political activities, a certain ambiguity shadows the 
non-white issue. 
Another viewpoint regarding Fusion was that of Leslie 
Blackwell, a member of Parliament at the time. In his book 
Farewell to Parliament, he speaks of "the relief I felt that the 
farce ~f a Fusion goverrunent under Hertzog had ended.,,5 However 
he adds that he did not think that the idea of Fusion itself was 
impossible, but that Fusion under Hertzog was impossible. To 
the Purified Nationalists under Dr. D.F. Malan, Hertzog in 
entering FuSion, had betrayed the Afrikaner people and their 
interests. It was as simple as that. In many ways Hertzog 
is a tragic figure in the annals of South Africa. He can with 
some justification be seen as the archetypal man of greatness, 
whose fatal flaw was _bris. He had a certain inteY'grity, and 
must always be commended for a genuine desire to unite the 
different elements in South Africa. His eclipse was a sad one, 
for he was rejected by all, even his own people, the Afrikaners, 
whose evolution as a national force he bad played so large a 
part in shaping. 
4. W.K. Hancock, Smuts, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1968, p. 292. 
5. L. Blackwell, Farewell to 1!arlL1Illent, Pieterrnari tzburg, 











When Fusion had come into being there were those who 
felt that compromise meant going under. These were the 
extremists, if not the lunatic fringe, of either side. The 
Nationalists who had not followed Hertzog into samesmel1;.in~ 
had formed a party of their own, the Purified Nationalist Party 
under Dr. Malan. The English-speaking people whose affinities 
to Britain were still stronger than their ties to South Africa, 
and who could find no comfortable niche in the United Party, 
formed the Dominion Party under Colonel StaLlard. In 
opposition to the government, the Purified Nationalists berated 
the United Party for what was in their view, a spineless 
toadying to British Imperialism, while the Dominionites lamented 
the slackening of ties with the CorIDnonwealth, and what was for 
them the Mother Country. 
G.D. Scholtz asserts that as a result of Hertzog's 
utterances in favour of the British Commonwealth, there was a 
continual stre~j of defection of Afrikaans-speaking United Party 
members to the National Party between 1934 and 1939. 6 With 
the advent of Fusion, a majority of Afrikaners in the Transvaal 
went over to the United Party, whilst in the Cape, Nationalist 
strength was more or less left undisturbed. The greatest 
turmoil arose in the Orange Free State, since Hertzog had a 
considerable personal following there. 1934 - 1939 saw a 
struggle between Hertzog and Dr. N.J~ van der Merwe for Leader-
ship of the Orange Free State Nationalists. In 1936 in the 
election for the Provincial CounCil, van der M.erwe was heartened 
to see that most Nationalists had stood firm, even though the 
United Party had won. 
In poli tios·,domestic problems are often examined as 
potential political weapons. The economic confrontation 
between Afrikaners and Africans in the cities, as a result of the 
exodus from the rural areas, was one of these problems. In the 
latter part of 1938, the Reddingsdaadbond was founded. Its 
instigator was a respected Nederduitse Gereformeerde Minister, 
The Reverend J.D. Kestell. At its inceptiorJ the society was 
meant to aid underprivileged Afrikaners but the society rapidly 











took on a political character I!nd in conjunction with the 
F.A.K. became an exclusively Nationalist enterprise. The 
Broederbond was another such organization. Pertaining to this 
question of economic rivalry was the Purified Nationalist attack 
on Jews of British extraction whom they accused of being 8i~ilii'r 
greedy capitalists or Communist agitators. As will be explained 
later, Anti-Semitism was becoming a force to be recognized in 
South Africa. "Here were the elements of a dynamic ideology 
to reinforce the time-hallowed Nationalist protests against 
subservience to Britain and particil)ation in British Imperialist 
. Wars." 7 
There was a great deal of Nationalist opposition to 
Jewish immigration in this period - in 1937 particularly. 
Some progressive and liberally minded people feel that Smuts 
pandered to anti-Semitic feeling. For instance Sarah Gertrude 
Millin, the authoress, who knew Smuts fairly intimately, always 
maintained that Smuts had bowed to the prejudice against Jews wher 
her husband, Philip Millin was not appointed to fill a vacant 
seat on the Supreme Court Bench. Whether or not this was an 
over:::;ight or a question of political expediency, is a matte-I>" 
for debate, but Smuts himself certainly harooured no anti-Jewish 
feelings. His attitude can be seen in his protest when Britain 
began restricting the flow of immigrants into Palestine, contrary 
to the policy laid down after the First World War: tlWe have 
given up so much of the fruits of the Great War that at least. 
this little ewe lamb should not also be slaughtered~8 One thing 
is certain, anti-Semitism and mhe Native question caused 
considerable tension in the Fusion government. 
In 1938 there were various incidents which alienated 
English-speaking members of the United F'arty. The renaming 
of Roberts Heights as Voortrekkerboogte was one of them. On 
Union Day 1938 a seemingly needless incident injured English-
speaking sentiment. At a parade attended by Mr. Pirow, then 
Plrinister of Defence, the heads of the Defence Fore-es, and the 
Prime llfinister, the Union Jack was taken down leaving only the 
Union Flag, while the military band played only "Die Stem van 
Suid Afrika" without including "tiod Save the King". These 
seem petty affairs but passion~ are often aroused by just such 
trivia. 
7. W.K. Hancock, Smuts, Vol II, p. 289. 











The United Party was also weakened at this time by the 
resignations from the cabinet of Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Sturrock 
over Hertzog's appointment of Mr. A.P.J. Fourie as a Native 
representative in the senate. Mr. Fourie had been an M.P. but 
in the General Election of 1938 he had been defeated. Hertzog, 
whose devotion to his followers was legendary, was determined to 
return him to Parliament. He therefore prevailed upon Senator 
"Matabele" Thompson to resign in favour of Mr. Fourie. In terms 
of the constitution, in order to be a native representative, ~he 
aspirant must be eligible by reason of "thorough acquaintance 
with the reasonable wants and wishes of the coloured races." 
It was Hofmeyr's and sturrock's contention that Mr. l!'ourie did 
not fill this requirement and also that the manner of his 
appointment was unconstitutional and smacked of intrigue. They 
had a point there, but considering ~he gravity of current events 
overseas, it seems a small thing to have occasioned such 
precipitous action on their part. 
Another event with ~mportant political implications in 
1938 was the Voortrekker Centenary celebrations. This symbolic 
trek from the Oape to Pretoria is worthy of inclusion because of 
the intense wave of nationalist sentiment which accompanied it. 
It seemed to provide a coherent rallying point for all Afrikaners 
) 
a burning cause - the preservation of the .a:t'rikaner spirit which 
had withstood hos~ile savages and British opposition in an 
a~temp~ ~o establish an independent exis~ence. The significance 
of this for the National Party was inestimable. Some have even 
gone so f'ar as to say that without it the National Party would 
not have been in a position, a decade later, to offer a serious 
challenge to the Unitea Party, much less to emerge as ~he vic~or. 
It is significant tha~ at the deaication of ~he Voortrekker 
Monumen~, General Hertzog was not invited to attend, and two 
women descendents of the Voortrekkers laid the stone. ~he 
Voortrekker celebrations quickened the sometimes aormant but 
ever-present anti-British and Republican sentimen~s of ~he 
af'rikaner people. 
This then w~s the domes~ic situation as ~he prospect of 
a second world war began to loom in "Che late 1930 ' s. l!'or South 
airica, the ques~ion of participation with Britain in a w~r 
agdinst uermany was no clear-cut decision, but ~ ~or~uous choice, 
complicated by the particular circumst~nces existing in ~outh 
1:l.!·rica and se~ting her apart from her feJ.low Dominions. 
000 000 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A~ the ~ime OI the Munich crisis, i~ was decided 











would not intervene. This was an informal decision taken by 
a few of the inner circle of Cabinet Ministers - Havenga, Firow, 
Smuts and Hertzog, and it pertained only to the existing crisis, 
not to possible future circumstances. It is important to clarify 
the fact that this was not a binding agreement to adopt an 
attitude of neutrality no matter what the circumstances. It was 
only on 28th September, 1938, that the entire cabinet approved 
) 
Hertzogs statement, which ran as follows: 
"StatemeLt of the attitude to be adopted by the 
Union of South Africa in the event of war in Europe 
with England as one of the belligerents: The 
existing relations between the Union of South Africa 
and the various belligerent parties shall, so far 
as the Union is concerned, remain unchanged and 
continue as if no war were being waged, witb the 
understanding bowever, that the existing relationsllips 
and ob1igations between the Union and Great Britain 
and any other of the DiFrr;bers of the British CODunon-
wealth of Nations in so far as those relationships and 
obligations are the result of contractual obligations 
concerning the naval base at Simonstown; or of its 
membership of the Leag~e of Nations, or in so far as 
the relationships etc. must be regarded I1fl?LICITER as 
flowing from the free association of the Union witb 
tbe other members of the Commonwealth shall remain 
unaltered, and shall be maintained by the Union; 
and that nobody shall be permitted to make use of 
Union territory for any purpose calculated to infringe 
the said relationships, and obligations. "9 
) 
Hertzog was not to deviate from this standpoint eveH wb.en Hi tlers 
breacbes of faith increased. Smuts however, although he also 
did not see the international situation witb absolute clarity 
at first, was to change his attitude, until at last, when the 
eruption came, he was convinced that in South Africats interests 
and in the interests of the world at large, Hitler must be 
stopped. 
The months preceding September, 1939 saw an airing of 
views on the international situation as if at'fected South Africa. 
The South African newspapers were full of the fulminations of 
politicians of dirferent persuasions. Despite the threatening 
European situation one notes tbat in the Rand Daily Mail of June 
. \ 
to August, 1939, a daring new dance called "swing" occupied as 
much space in the letters to the Editor as overseas crises and 
South African politics. During these months the election of a 
wool-queen was competing with international affairs in the 
Bloemfontein VolksblaQ -
9. C.M. van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog, Johannesburg, 











As it became clearer that there was to be a war, the 
Nationalists made haste to clarify their view of the course 
South Africa should choose in relation to a war against the 
Axis powers. In May, 1939, the Nationalists published a 
manifesto ratified by the parliamentary caucus of the Purified 
National Party, and signed by the leaders of the Party in each 
province - Dr. D.F. Malan (Cape), Dr. N.J. van der Merwe (Orange 
Free State), Mr. J.G. StrydoDl (Transvaal) and Mr. A.J. Nel 
(Natal). The basic tenets of the Nationalist attitude are to l)e 
found in this statement. It was felt that if South Africa 
herself was attacked, she would defend herself, but that she 
wanted no part in a war overseas which did not concern her. The 
l"usion government was accused of endeavouring to involve South 
Africa willy-nilly in a war in which it could have no possible 
interest. 
"We are convinced that the overwhelming majority 
of the people of South Africa, and most certainly the 
overwhelming majority of all nationally-minded elements, 
notwithstanding nationality or party, desire in reality 
a resolute policy of neutrality and abhor and repudiate 
the dragging of our country into a devastating war."lO 
It is rather more difficult to pin down the attitude of 
the United Party as a whole, since its leader General Hertzog 
would issue no statement regarding neutrality or participation, 
saying merely in March, 1939, that if and when the time caIne, 
parliament would decide. It was an odd situation. Bearing 
in mind Hertzog's neutrality statement of the previous year, 
it was not unlikely that his attitude would still be the same. 
Not even his colleagues in the government knew quite what he 
was thinking. The uncertainty within the United Farty can be 
seen in the conflicting speeches made by United Party N.P's at 
the time. While Senator Clarkson was assuring constituents 
that the government would go into a war "Boots and all! "II, 
General Kemp, the chairman of the United Party in the Transvaal, 
and Minister of Lands was saying publicly and with great emphasis 
.~ 
that South Africa would not go into a war. This must surely 
offer some comment on the co-ordination of the Fusion goverlUJJent! 
10. Rand Daily N:ail, 13 May, 1939, p. 12. 











General Smuts by this tiIne was firmly convinced that if 
Germany and Englarid should be at war, South Africa must play an 
active pe,rt in helping to rid the world of the threat to 
democracy. He made his views known in at least twenty speecbes 
delivered between October, 1938 and August, 1939. It is 
important to clarify this, since he was later accused by Oswald 
Pirow and General Hertzog of a perfidious cloaking of his real 
convictions behind a mask of agreement with the Prime Minister. 
Most English-speaking people felt that South Africa must play 
her part in a war in which the Commonwealth was involved. This 
was not simply a matter of sentimental attachment to Britain but 
a deep-seated conviction that the Nazi evil must be halted. 
If the above-mentioned diametrically opposed viewpoints 
had no ramifications, the chronicle of South Africa's reaction 
to the outbreak of the Second World War would be a relatively 
simple matter. However there were very unpleasant undertones 
in this period, and as in any emotional crisis, passions were 
easily inflamed, and kept smouldering by the Press. ~o pleas 
that South Africa should enter the war to safeguard democracy, 
the immediate rejoinder of neutrality supporters was that, if· 
Britain was fighting for democracy, why were no less than five 
of those with whom she was seeking to co-operate, dictatorships? 
i.e. Hussia, Poland, Humania, 'furkey and Greece. This was an 
awkward question. Perhaps it would have been better for those 
who favoured South African participation in a war to sunply 
state a conviction that it was imperative that Hitler's plans 
for world domination be foiled. 
~Irom the Nationalist Afrikaner's point of view it was 
intolerable that the young men of the country should go off to 
faraway places to right a remote war because of Britain's 
commitments to Poland. This on its own is a perfectly 
legitimate viewpoint, but there is a blind spot in it, caused 
by the Afrikaner's hatred of Britain. Why should Britain drag 
South Africa into war unless there was some very cogent reason 
for it? B,y this time Hitler's intentions were no longer even 
thinly disguised, and why, if he could swallow up countries in 
Europe, would he scruple, if it suited him, to take South Africa 
too? The Witwatersrand would be a rich prize, and on South 











Nevertheless, from day to day in the newspapers one 
reads of Nationalist indignation at the prospect of being 
"dragged" into1!;ngland's wars. The following extract from 
Die Burger is typical of the sort of sentiment expressed: 
"Advokaat Conradie het verklaar dat daar 'n seksie in die land is 
wat propaganda teen Duitsland maak sodat die publiek kant moes 
kies teen Duitsland sodat wanneer daar oorlog tussen Engeland 
en Duitsland uitbreek, die Unie ook ingesleep word.,,12 This 
was the purport of Advocate J.N. Conradie's speech at a protest 
,meeting in Upington on July 10th, 1939. 
The English-speaking section were also very free with 
their accusations. Spokesmen berated the Nationalists for 
what in their view was a defeatist outlook. They were accused 
of waving the white flag and there were constant and injudicious 
assertions that Afrikaners were pro-Nazi. While it could 
possibly have been true that in the mind f some Afrikaners any 
country was more deserving of sympathy and aid than Britain, the 
categorizing of all neutrality-supporters as traitors was quite 
as blind and unfair as the unreasoning hatred directed against 
those who were sincerely convinced that to enter the war was a 
matter of principle. 
It was evident that party politics prevailed over any 
question of a broad national view. In the words of ~eneral 
Smuts: "In this country there is always a temptation to try to 
derive political advantage from such a situation or any calffinity, 
and I would ask the p~ople to hold aloof from such attempts. II13 
In keeping with the tenor of this statement was a call to 
moral rearmament signed by such men as J.ll. Hofmeyr, E.G. Jansen 
(Speaker of the House of Assembly), Senator .iI'. S. Malan and Genera] 
Smuts. "Vie make bold to sound to the people of South Africa, 
a call to a new patriotism, a new hope and a new purpose in their 
individual lives as the sure means of enabling the nation to play 
a worthy part in the ret:)eneration of the world.,,14 This 
statement, with its plea for a higher aspiration, was refreshing 
after the hurly burly of party politics. One notes among its 
signatories men whose personal conviction was, that South Africa 
12. Die Burger, 10 July, 1939, p. 7. 
13. Rand Daily 1:ail, 24 August, 1939, p. 7. 





















should participate on Britaids side in a war. Another man, 
with a totally different viewpoint, proved that he also could 
rise above the petty bickerings of party politics. Convinced 
that the interests of South Africa demanded a policy of 
neutrality, Dr. Karl Bremer tthe leader of the Cape Nationalists) 
did not indulge in the fiercely antagonistic abuse which had 
marred the exchanges between the opposing groups in relation to 
the neutrality issue. He simply stated that to him, the 
interests of the National Party did not come first. Of priority 
were the interests of South A1'rica and it was for that reason 
that he urged all elements to join in support of a policy of 
neutrality. 15 
Another point of view expressed by neutrality supporters 
was that since other countries such as Holland and BelgiUm which 
were also presumably threatened by Hitler, had declared them-
selves neutral, what was so different or peculiar about a South 
African policy of neutrality? Hitler's later invasion of 
Eelgium was to provide a crushing reply to this, but that was 
still in the future. 
'fhere was a great deal of acrimonious debate over what 
Mr. J.N. Con:vadie, M.P. picturesquely called "die Suidwesbang-
maakgogga.,,16 As will be explained later there was a good deal 
of Nazi interest in South West Afric:i and many people in the 
Union, including General Smuts, were well aware of this. 
Germany had often reiterated a deltland for the retur:l of her 
colonies. By 1939, there were a great many Union Citizens 
living in South West Africa, and for strategic reasons, any 
idea of returning it to Germany was considered impossible by 
the Union Government. The National Party however, in what 
appeared very like a "peace at any price" attitude, indicated 
that it was prepared to surrender South West Africa rather than 
be involved in a suicidal war with uermany. A deputation 
representing the South West Africa League visited South Africa 
in June to discuss the future of the territory with Union lvI.P's. 
"Dr. D.~·. Malan and the Nationalist Party caucus refused to see 
them, so a private discussion was held with Mr. Paul Sauer, the 
Party's chief whip. Mr. Sauer issued an even stricter 
15. Die Volksblad, 14 August, 1939, p. 7. 











interpretation of the Nationalist neutrality policy than had 
hitherto been given. It ran as follows: 
"1. South Africa must un(ler all circll!Ustances 
remain neutral':lncl simply protect her borders. 
2. The National Party's desire is that South 
West Africa should be incorporated in the 
Union, but this must be done through friendly 
negotiation with Germany. 
3. If no amicable solution can be found and 
Germany demands South West Africa and even 
attacks it, South Africa must still remain 
neutral and give up South West Africa to 
avoid the possibility of the territory's 
iIlvolving the Union in a war. 
4. ~or the Union to take a hostile stand 
~gainst Gennany would be suicide. 
5. Should the Union, Britain, and France 
decide not to grant a possible German 
demand and a war with Gennany result, 
South Afric''1. rnust then still remain neutral. "17 
Even more startling than this, was Mr. Sauer's reply to 
a deleg:'3.te' s question regarding protection for Afrij{aners in 
South West Africa. "We have every sympathy with the Afrikaners 
in South West Africa. \Ve feel sorry for theil1 and underst::ind 
their position, but in the ct!use of South Africal1 neutrality and 
to protect the million Afrikaners in the Union, the 20,000 
Afrikaners must be s~crificed."18 
'rhis speech was criticized by the English-language Press, 
and political capital \Tvas made out of the situation by the United 
Party, which received the South West Delegation ~ith nlany 
protest,~tions of friendship and assurances of protection. 
Senator A.P.J. Fourie, the ~Hinister of Railways and Harbours, at 
a public meeting in the Graaff-Reinet Town Hall asserted that 
not only were the Nationalists prepared to :3.oandon the South 
West African Afrikaners to Hitler, but were also prepared to 
surrender tile country's gold mines. 19 The last statement as 
far as can be ascertained has not b(~en substantiated, but it is 
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Eventually, stung by the vituperation levelled at him 
over this affair, Dr. Malan, at a party meeting in Volksrust on 
Thursday, 14 AUb~st, offered an explanation of his refusal to 
see the delegation. He informed his audience that he had 
received reliable information to the effect that the deleg:3.tes, 
who in his view, did not truly represent the Afrikaners in South 
West Africa, had come to Cape Town directly froJJl a visit to 
Bulawayo with the express purpose of discrediting the National 
Party's neutrality policy. 20 The South west .A.frica League 
was concerned about the fl"azi threat in South West, and, 
representing as it did the South African residents in the 
territory, (most of whom were afrikaners) it had not anticipated 
a repudiation by fellow-Afrikaners in the Union when its 
deputies had gone there to seek reassurance that South West 
Afric8. would not be abandoned to the Nazis. 
While all this was in pr06re:]u, the ~.i(lister of Defence, 
r.'fr. Oswald Pirow, added another facet to the controversy by 
stating that in his view, although neither Tanganyika nor South 
West Africa should be returned to their for:ner ovmer, r..;·errJ.any 
should receive ;i1onetary compens:.1tion. Pirow was sayi:ls thi:'l3.S 
a private person, not in his capacity of C:3.binet h:,inister, 'but 
nevertheless it seems to have been unwise. The incident 
sparked off a good deal of speculation and comment. A spokesman 
at the Wilhelmstrasse issuer} a statement saying that there could 
be no question of Germany taking compensa.tion for colonies. 
Sir Abe Bailey wrote a strongly worded letter to the Press 
condemning any such l)rOposal. Mr. J .R. Hofmeyr, in a speech 
at a Grahamstown public rneeting on Wednesday July 5, expressed 
the feeling of most South Africans as well as the United Party 
when he said: "We are not prepared to ~gree to the surrender of 
;1.ny mandated territories in A.frica to the German Government 13.S 
it is tOday.,,21 
Dr. I\~alan and the Purified Nationalists did not budge 
an.inch from their standpoint and at one point suggested 
"peaceful discussions" with Germany over the possi 1)tl.t 'c:J of 
incorporating South West Africa into the Union.22 :2r. Iualan 
---------_. 
-
20. Die VoL;:sbLl.d, 25 August, 1939, p. 7. 
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also said on this occasior. that a2 far as he could see Germany 
did not harbour any aggressive designs on South West Africa, 
and that he was sure that Germany would view South Africa's 
claims sympathetically. This was late in August 1939, and to 
date there had been very little evidence to anticipate any such 
reasonable behaviour from Hitler. The +atter fact was pointed 
out with some emphasis in the English-language Press. 
As can be seen there was a great deal of feverish 
political activity in South Africa during these pre-war months. 
In their efforts to prove to the government and South Africa at 
large that there was an overwhelming proportion of public opinion 
strongly opposed to South African participation in a war against 
Germany, the Nationalists organized a survey. Die Burger 
reported in early August 1939 that the co-ordinator of the 
survey, Dr. Theo Wassenaar, was receiving thousands of petitions 
for neutrality every day.23 
An easily discernible trend in Nationalist thinking was 
the anti-Imperialist sentiment with its corollary, the desire 
for a Republic. Repeatedly such leaders as Dr. Malan, Mr. J.G. 
Strydom (leader of the Transvaal Nationalists) and Mr. Eric 
Louw, M.P., had deplored the connection with Britain. The 
Irish Republican movement which had in 1937 under Eamon de Valera 
at last achieved the long-desired independence from Britain, was 
often used as a parallel in expressing the desire for freedom 
from the British connection. Advocate Eric Louw said at 
Stellenbosch "Die eeue-oud stryd van die Ierse volK teen 
vreemde oorheersing, hul strewe na self-bestuur en later na 
volle onafhanklikheid ••••..•..• , vorm 'n geskiedenis wat 
noodwer.dig 'n snaar moet roer in die hart van elke vryheid-
liewende Afrikaner.,,24 
Repuolicanism had persisted in the Afrikaner ideology 
ever since the days of the Great Trek, and to many it was the 
ultimate in government. The main obstacle was these stubborn 
"Englisbmen" who persisted in their at"fection for the British 
constitutional form. It was not only the politicians who 
nurtured the Republican ideal. The Afrikaans-nasionale 
studentebond voiced its desire for a Hepuolic, free of "die 
l81D.sakkerige Britse Statebond."25 
23. Die Burger, 1 August, 1939, p, 1. 
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To Nationalist accusations that South Africa danced 
when Britain played the tune, some Commonwealth supporters 
replied that South Africa was perfectly free to do as she chose. 
Admittedly there were some who saw ~he link between Britain and 
South Africa as an indivisible one, legally necessitating joint 
action, no ma~ter what the circumstance. Such an opinion was 
expressed by Mr. C.W.A. Coulter, M.P. when addressing the 
International Study Circle of the University of Cape Town on 
'rhursday 17th August, 1939. He said that a South African 
refusal to join Britain in the event of a war against Germany 
would be a repudiation of the crown, and an act of secession 
from the British Empire. 26 This accorded with the Dominion 
Party's view of the situation, but was very tactless taking into 
consideration the large body of opinion in the country which 
feared Imperialist bondage. lViost Commonwealth supporters 
however, felt that although by virtue of the Statute of 
Westminster South Africa was free to do as she chose, she should, 
for the good of the country, support Britain. Weight was lent 
to this view by the visit of the Duke of Devonshire, Under-
Secretary for Dominion Affairs, in June 1939. At a civic 
banquet in the Carlton Hotel on Thursday 22 June, 1939, he said 
bluntly: "People who talk about government from Whitehall are 
talking nonsense. We have a new conception. We have tried for 
many years past to foster the ideal of self-government and today 
it is a fact that there is no such thing as Vnnitehall control. 
The Dominions are equal to England as free members of the 
British Commonweal tt~ of Nations. ,,27 
It is important not to forget, in the heat of these 
controversies, that there were many Afrikaners within the United 
Party who had been large-hearted enough to forget the bitterness 
of previous Anglo-South Afric~ association, and to give their 
loyalty to the Corr~onwealth. Such a one was the Administrator 
of the Transvaal, General J.J. Pienaar who stressed the value of 
the kinship within the Commonwealth and South Arrica's right to 
join the other Dominions in fighting for the preservation of 
liberty. 28 What was even more remarkable was that General 
Pienaar had been one of the rebels in 19l4! 
The struggle in South Africa was not a sharp, English-
speaking vs Afrikaner delineation. It was more complex than 
that. The very fact that there were Afrikaners who saw the 
26. Rand Daill Mail, 17 AUgust, 1939, p. 11. 
27. Rand Daill Mail, 22 June, 1939, p. 6. 











British connection as a practical necessity and did not abhor 
it, was a constant vexation to the Purified Nationalists to whom 
the fight for Afrikaner identity was almost a holy war. The 
feeling that it was intolerable to have disunity amongst 
Afrikaners, had been present ever since the inception of Fusion, 
and even in 1939 there was talk of reunion. 
On August 20, 1939, Dr. N.J. van der Merwe, M.P., leader 
of the Orange Free State Nationalists, addressing a meeting at 
Theunisse.n suggested that "toenadering" was possible under the 
following conditions - a public neutrality declaration; separate 
coloured residential areas and a segregation of the coloured 
vote. He also stated that the Nationalist Party "refused to 
throw in its weight with liberalisit, Imperialism or Communism. ,,29 
Immediately rumours began to flow thick and fast, and 
there was a good deal of speculation both in the Press and by 
the public as to whether this talk of reunion had any factual 
foundation. Dr. Malan quashed these rumours on 22nd August, 
saying that although both be and Gen ral Hertzog had been 
approached regarding a possible reunion, a stage had not yet 
been reached where such a step was possible. He himself had had 
no communica~ion with General Hertzog and he assured his followerf 
that were any such plan under consideration he (Malan) would 
keep them informed himself. 30 
Various private individuals and branches of the 
Nationalist Party had for some time past been sending requests 
to General Hertzog to clarify his position as regards South 
Africa's course in the event of war. His consistent reply was 
that when the time came parliament would decide. This 
contained no shred of comfort for supporters of neutrality. 
Their rejoinder was that in 1914 they had been fobbed off with 
the same explanation that parliament would decide. Their 
interests had not been safe-guarded then, and they thus harboured 
grave doubts as to whether they would fare any better this time. 
The anxiety over Hertzog's refusal to commit himself, was 
by no means confined to the Purified Nationalists. Bertha 
Solomon, in her book Time Remembered speaks of the anxiety felt 
by the English-speaking section as the war clouds mounted and 
still Hertzog remained silent. "Time and again he had side-
stepped the question and refused to commit himself. Parliament 
29. Rand Daily Mail, 21 August, 1939, p. 10. 











would decide, he said, when the time carne. Once more, 
inevitably, English-speaking South Africa was suspicious." 
The Dominion Party with its nucleus in Natal had always 
been vocal, but does not appear to have had a great deal of 
influence during its period of existence. At the outset of 
Fusion, Generals Hertzog and Smuts had issued a prograIT~e of 
principles for their joint effort. Included amongst these was 
what might be interpreted as a mild sop to the Republicia,nism 
which still lOdged in the minds of many. It ran as follows: 
"While the Party stands for the maintenance of 
the present constitutional position, no-one will 
be denied the right to express his individual 
opinion about or advocate his honest convictions 
in connection with any change of our form of 
government. "31 
Colonel Stallard and six other English-speaking M.P.'s took 
exception to this, and broke away f.£,9JIl the Dominion Party. 
This was in July, 1934. Imperial~votees, the Dominioni tes) 
viewpoint was that if Britain entered into a war, South Africa 
must autoDlatically join her. Their cardinal principle was the 
indivisibility of the British Crown. i.e. the King could not 
be at war in Great Britain and neutral in South Africa. As has 
been TIJentioned before, the Statute of Westminster rendered this 
interpretation invalid in a legal sense. When neutrality 
supporters accused the United Party government of toadying to 
Imperialism they were wide of the mark, but they had more 
justification when they designated the Dominionites thus. 
At the time of the Duke of Devonshire's visit to South 
Africa, Colonel Stallard suggested that a Royal visit might be 
timely. In his view this might have been so, but the very 
thought of it was anathema to a large proportion of the South 
African public. In an article which appeared in the Transvaler 
on June 24, anysuggestion of a Royal visit was fiercely 
repudiated, and contempt expressed for what was seen as the 
propagandist motive behind it. Similar statements appeared in 
other Afrikaans-language newspapers. 
The point of view of the Dominion Party must be expresse~ 
since it fOl~S part of the body of public opinion concerned with 
the question of neutrality, but at no stage was the Dominion 
Party ever a real threat to the Nationalists or the United Party. 
It had a small parliamentary representation, having gained only 
eight seats in the election of 1938. 32 This means that it had 
31. Hancock, Smuts, Vol. II, p. 258. 











only gained one seat since 1934. By mid-1939, the Party seemed 
to be on the downgrade, especially since Colonel Stallard had 
los~ his seat in Parliament. This fact was noted in the June 
1939 issue of the Commonwealth publication, the Rourld Table 
"There are today definite signs of impending 
disintegration of the Dominion Party. It has 
virtua+ly no hold in the country anywhere outside 
Durban, and it is losing ground there. The 
English-speaking section of the cOUIltry seems to 
be rallying more and more to the government's 
support. As the news from Europe has grown in 
gravity, the necessity for maintaining a united 
front has come to be increasingly appreciated." 
The only common ground between the Nationalists and the 
Dominion Party was their conviction that the United Party 
constituted a threat to South Africa. Their reasons for 
thinking this, however, were widely divergent. While the 
National Party saw the United Party Ii;.F. I S as war-mongers, the 
Dominionites considered the government a threat to democracy, 
because it would make no definite statement about joining 
Britain in a possible war. 
In l,ate August 1939, Colonel Stallard was contesting 
a Pietermaritzburg seat against Senator Clarkson. A leading 
article in the Natal Witness requested him to withdraw in the 
interests of national unity considering the grave international 
situation. The Dominion Party's reply was that they felt it to 
be imperative that Colonel Stallard should be in parliament in 
order to stress the view that it would be disastrous for South 
Africa to remain neutral in the event of war. 33 
Yet another political party in existence at this time was 
the Labour Party. At one time it had been of considerable 
importance, i.e. in its alliance with the National Party in 1924 
to form the Pact government. However by 1939 it was simply a 
party with a small representation in parliament, starJding for the 
interests of white labour in South Africa. Judging by the 
newspa:pers of the period, it does not seem to have featured very 
largely in the debate prior to the outbreak of war. It was 
concerned with what seemed to be a growth of Fascism in South 
Africa. At the first annual Labour conference of the South 
African Labour League of Youth in Johannesburg on 3 July, 1939, 











it was suggested that a campaign be initiated to awaken South 
African youth to the dangers of Ji'ascism. 34 On another 
occasion, after Mr. Pirow, the Minister of Defence had stated 
that in his opinion, should war break out, martial law would be 
proclaimed, the Labour Party resolved the following -
"that this contenwlated step of the Minister is a 
complete negation of the princil)les of democracy and is clefirJi tely 
of a Fascist character and that in view of the Democracies being 
called upon to fight Fascism, presents itself as a remarkable 
paradoxo,,35 The leaders of the Labour Party at this time were 
English-speaking and this fact, plus the Party's anti-Fascist 
attitude, mean~ that it favoured joining Britain in a war should 
the need arise. 
In late August, goaded by Hertzog's continuing silence, 
Dr. Malan called for ~ general election on the neutrality issue. 
This was on August 24th. There were also proposals from 
various quarters that a referendum be held to decide the 
neutrality issue. Both these expedi nts were unwieldy in the 
extreme, and considering the imminence of war, the ability for 
decisive parliamentary action was imperative. As it happened 
neither proposal came to fruition. 
The feverish political activity did not abate even in the 
last days of August. In the merultime the ordinary citizens 
waited, ears anxiously attuned to the crisis on the doorstep 
overseas. Only when war crossed the threshold, would there be 
an answer to the neutrality issue. 
34. Rand Daily Mail, 3 July, lSJ39, p. 10. 











DIS(JUIETING TRENDS IN THE PRE-WAR PERIOD. 
During the period of South African history under 
discussion, a certain trend towards authoritarianism was 
discernible. Apart from the definitely fascist or Nazi 
movements such as the Greyshirts, there also seeIlled to be a 
dictatorial current insinuating itself into the government. 
This was tangible enough to excite comment in liberal circles, 
and in various publications a warning was sounded. 
Admiration of the prinCiple of strong, individual 
leadership in South Africa was a deep-rooted psychological 
phenomenen, stretching back in history to the times of the 
Voortrekkers, when loyalty to a single leader was both a 
necessity and an intense sentimental attachment. Commendable 
as such 19yalty might be in certain Circumstances, when carried 
to extremes it would conflict with the democratic ideal of 
popular sovereignty. In the relations between General Eertzog 
and his followers, upon occasion just such a blind attachment 
seemed to pOint to the abdication of freedom of individual 
judgement. For instance, amid the furore when :Mr. Hofmeyr 
and Mr. sturrock resigned, the Minister of Native Affairs was 
heard to say, "General Hertzog has won our confidence to such 
an extent that we are w lling to follow his guidance 
unconditionally, knowing that he has intuitive understanding 
of what should be done in any circumstances or crises. III This 
may simply have been a heartwarming evidence of trust in the 
Prime Minister, but many saw in it more sinister implications. 
General Hertzog's autocratic TIlanner in dealirlg with the 
caucus and his colleagues in the government has been meI::tioned 
before. Of a serious turn of mind, with fifteen. years of 
office behind him, perhaps a tendency to want his own way was 
understandable in a man no longer young. However, this was not 
merely a matter of Hertzog's manner. Inroads into freedom were 
seen in the Prime Minister's threat to impose cerisorship of the 
Press in 1939. Apparently the desire to curb the Press arose 
from numerous newspaper insults directed at foreign leaders and 
representatives for which Hertzog was constrained to apologize. 2 
1. Review of the Politics of the 
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According to G.A.L. Green, then Editor of the Cape Argus, it was 
at the request of the German Minister Plenipotentiary that 
Hertzog broached the subject of Press restrictions. At a 
subsequent conference betweeD Hertzog and leading South Ai'rican 
Edi tors, Hertzog defended himself againf;t accusations of tyranny 
by saying that the anti-Nazi attitude of various South African 
newspapers alienated Germany to the pOint where the Union's 
trade could be affected. 3 
Whatever the origin of the move, there was an immediate 
outcry in newspaper circles, and from individual members of the 
public. In the protests levelled at the Prime Minister it was 
apparent that this move towards censorship was not seen as an 
isolated incident, but as one of a series of anti-democratic 
moves. This indicates that the fear of dictatorial methods 
was fairly wide-spread. 
Another proposal which lent weight to the rear of 
autocracy at this time was that the rules of procedure of the 
House of Assembl.y should be altered. The alteration would have 
muzzled the opposition to some extent. 4 Other moves of similar 
ilk under consideration were control of the political activities 
of teachers, and a prohibition of certain types of public 
meetings. The Transvaal Teachers Association took note of the 
situation in an article published in the Transvaal Educational 
News: "In a quiet unobtrusive way, dictatorial powers are 
being given to certain individuals in this country over the lives 
and well-being of the ordinary citizens without aIly check or 
safeguard being offered in exchange, either by recourse to the 
courts of law or to ParliAment itself." 
Amongst high goverrunent officials a rather totalitarian 
outlook was at times displayed. "How can we expect that the 
policy of the Govermaent can be carried out if we do not have 
peoIJle who are going to follow the policy of the Govermnent one 
hundred per cent?" asked the Minister of Lands on one occasio!l. 5 
A man who COlJ.Sistel;tly stood out for the maintenance of 
Ii beral ideals was J .H. Hofmeyr. Vocal in conderfJrJing the 
3. G.A.L. Green, An Editor Looks Back, Cape Town, 1947, pp. 
203 - 204. 
4. Round Table, No. 114, March, 1939, p. 637. 











anti-Semitism prevalent among some sections in the country, he 
also frequently warned the public in a regular column of the 
Forum magazine, entitled "Notes By the Way" of anti-democratic 
tendencies in the government. He directed attention at the 
dictatorial attitude of the multi tude of governnlent-appointed 
control boards, and at the threats to f'reedom of association, 
thought and expression. In liberal circles there was a feeling 
that a Liberal Party should be founded to fight for the 
preservation of democratic ideals. Providing as he did a 
rallying poirlt for such ideals, "It was by no means an 
inconsiderable body of young men who would have followed Hofmeyr 
into a new party in the late 1930's.n6 
There was clearly then, a feeling in the countrJ that a 
leaning towards totalitarianism existed, and that it was a 
distinct menace. Generally-speaking it seems that such a 
tendency did exist, but it is doubtful whether the goverw1Jent 
really anticipated the drastic encroachnlents on democracy imputed 
to it by certain sections of public oI,inion at the time. 
Certainly it would be inaccurate and unrealistic to aSSUlIe that 
General Hertzog contemIJlated anything approaching a real 
dictatorship. Haughty he may have been, but throughout his life 
he had shown himself to be committed to the principles of 
constitutional government, and in South Africa, as in the other 
Dominions, that implied democratic government. 
However, exaggerated as was the public view of the 
government in this connection, there was good reason for 
arprehension in another sphere. ~uite definitely there was a 
movement afoot in South Africa to subvert, if possible, the 
population to an adoption of Fascism or National Socialism. 
The inspiration for this came from the totalitarian countries 
abroad, and it found a breeding-ground in the confused political 
situation in South Africa where hatred of Englanaand fear of 
racial extinction formed a powerful current which sometimes 
submerged the more generous instincts of Afrikaners. It had a 
very definite bearing on the attitude of some towards the outbreak 
of the Second World War. 
In 1933, at the same time as Hitler's assumption of power 
in Germany, there had appeared in South Africa various 
organizations which displayed the same characteristics as those 
of Nazi Germany - a desire for a totalitarian state, a violent 
anti-Semitism, and a taste for uniforms, drilling and insignia. 











The "Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Sosialistiese Bond," commonly 
known as the Greyshirts, was founded in the Cape by Louis '1'. 
Weichardt. In the Transvaal a similar movement started up 
under the leadership of a certain Manie Wessels. This was the 
National Democratic Party. A splinter group from this Transvaal 
group was "Die Volksbeweging" or "Hlackshirts" under the 
leadership of a man called Chris Havemann. These 
organizations disseminated Nazi propaganda, aimed for the most 
part at the lower-class Afrikauers in urban and rural areas. 
Both the Greyshirts and the Blackshirts issued publications 
calculated to further their aims. The propaganda organ of 
the former was called Die Waarheid and that of the latter Ons 
Reg. Hoth showed marked similarity to the German anti-Semitic 
publication Der Stuermer. Apparently the Blackshirts and Grey-
shirts joined forces in 1936 under the name of the "South African 
National Gentile Fascist Society." 7 'rhr ughout the thirties, 
these organizations came in for public attention because of 
their anti-Semitic and anti-democratic activities. Various 
individuals were tried on charges of inciting hatred among the 
races, but it seems that very little decisive action w~s taken 
by the government to stamp out these movements, despite the 
urgings of the Jewish Board of Deputies, until the middle of 
1939. 
On June ~4, Louis Weichardt was round guilty of 
contravening the Riotous Assemblies Act and was sentenced to 
. k·· t 8 ~J.X, wee s ~mpr~sonmen • 
A measure taken in June to deal with "underground 
movements and foreign-inspired associatio~" was the setting up 
of a special branch of the South African Police, modelled along 
the lines of ~cotland Yard's special branch. 9 
In July 1939, meetings of the Blackshirt organization 
were banned in almost every town on the Heer, by magistrates 
with special authority from the Minister of Justice, under the 
provisions of the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal LaW Amen&nent 
Act. Polic.~ were instructed to stand by to prevent such 
meetings taking place. lO The fact that this action was taken 
so relatively late in the day indicates that the South African 
domestic situation was growing more tense due to the political 
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The propaganda disseminated by the above-mentioned 
bodies was of so crude and blatant a nature that there was little 
chance of it influencing thinking people. However, on the 
lesser-educated, its effects might well have been pernicious. 
Another body which added to the incipient climate of 
Nazi feeling in South Africa, was the Ossewa-Brandwag. 
Probably deriving its impetus from the great racial urge 
generated by the voortrekker Centenary, the Ossewa-Brandwag had 
originally been organized by a certain Colonel Laas, then a 
member of the befence Force. Disillusioned by the apathy 
among the common rank of soldiers, he conceived a plan for 
selecting the best men and giving them special training - making 
them in eI-fect a sort of elite guard under his own personal 
leadership. Obviously such a plan would not find official 
recogni tion wi thin the framework of the Det"ence Force 
organization, nor was it intended that it should. When Laas 
mentioned this idea to Dr. Hans van Rensburg then still 
) 
Administrator of the Orange Free state, the latter suggested the 
name Ossewa-Brandwag as a suitable title, carrying with it 
connotations of militant alertness and adherence to the ideals 
of the Great Trek. 
Officially founded on February 4th, 1939, in 
Bloemfontein, this organization excited suspicion because of the 
secretive nature of its activities. Posing as a purely cultural, 
apolitical body, it was in reality a militant Hepublican group, 
composed exclusively of Afrikaners, whose ends were nothing if 
not political. It too displayed a predilection for uniforms, 
secret drilling, military organization, and all the other trade-
marks unpleasantly associated wi~h authoritarianism. There 
was even a group of "stormjaers". 
The manifesto of the Ossewa-Brandwag was innocuous 
enough , if too exclusively Afrikaner-orientated for the tastes 
of English-speaking South Africans. ego 
"(a) die hoofdoel en strewe van die O.B. is die 
voortplanting, beskenning en uitlewing van die Voortrekker-
beginsels en ideale, insluitende die godsdienstige, morele, en 
ekonomiese opbou van ons volk. ,,11 'Ehere were many in South 
11. A.J.H. van der Walt, In Volk op Trek - of 'n kort 
~eskiedenis van die ontstaan en ontwL,keling van die Ossewa 











Africa who considered that this was not the whole tale, among 
them General Smuts, who was later to say: 
IIAlhoewel die Ossewa-Brandwag volhou dat dit 
niks meer as 'n kultuur-organisasie is, is dit 
duidelik dat dit 'n organisasie is van presies 
dieselfde aard as die wat Hitler aan die bewind 
gebring het in Duitsland. Sy metodes kom reguit 
Duitsland, en sy doel is niks minder as om die 
stelsel wat in Duitsland heer, in hierdie land in 
te voer nie."12 
Colonel Laas was the first Commandant-General of the 
Ossewa-Brandwag. A tireless worker, but unpopular and tactless, 
he was replaced in 1940 by Mr. Hans van Rensburg, who had 
studied in Germany, and who made no secret of his admiration 
for National Socialism. He gave up his post as Administrator 
of the Orange Free State in order to assume leadership of the 
Ossewa-Brandwag. At first suspicious of the organization, it 
seemed as if Malan's Purified National Party might see its way 
clear to a rapprochement for mutual benefit, but only with the 
proviso that the O.B. must not meddle in politics. AS it 
happened, the organization became progressively more embroiled 
in politics, and it was this intrusion on their province which 
made the Nationalists sever connections with the Ossewa-Brandwag. 
~he movement as such only really assumes significance in 
the early forties, out nevertheless in the period under 
consideration it was already in existence and must therefore be 
treated. In considering the acts of treason and espionage laid 
at the door of the O.b. it is interesting to read the following 
provision of its manifesto: 
"Dat die 0.1:3. as organisasie geen ondermyneude 
bedrywighede en geen gebruikmaking van geweld of 
van ondergrondse rewolusionere aktiwiteite beoog 
of duld nie of om bevriende politieke partye of 
liggame in hul bedrywighede te benadeel of op 
enige wyse te ondermyn me."13 
There were various 'bomb outrages in the early years of 
the war, and though it was never proven, it was always thought 
that the Ossewa-Brandwag had been responsible. For instance, 
the Benoni Post Orfice w~s blown up, as was the Alberton Post 
Office. The latter building had been rather a tumbledown 
12. V~n der Walt, In Yolk op Trek, p. 45. 











edifice, and after the bombing the Townspeople rejoiced in the 
fact that a nice new brick building had to be built! A few 
electric pylons were detonated and an attempt made at dislocating 
the railway system, but these acts of sabotage never reached 
unmanageable proportions. 
It must be stressed that during the period covered by 
this essay, these events h'ld not yet occurred, nor had the 
Ossewa-Brandwag yet gained the political and numerical strength 
which it was later to enjoy. Hans van Rensburg himself, in 
his book Their Paths Crossed Mine, indicates that it was the 
actual declaration of war and subsequent internment of 
Afrilcaners, which accelerated the growth of the Ossewa-Brandwag. 
Nevertheless, with its militant opposition to any though"t of 
entry into a war against Germany, and its Nazi sympathies, its 
very existence in these pre-war months helps to fill in the 
shade~j of public opinion surrounding South Africa's entry into 
the Second World War. 
It was not only the English-s..?eakinG South AfricA.ns who 
looked aslcance at the O. B. Some Afrikaners also saw it as 
undesirable, while others accepted it Rt its f~ce value, but 
thought it needless. The latter was t:le v-iew of Dr. n. J. van 
der Merwe, leader of the Free State National Party. "I cannot 
refrain from saying that the institution of yet another cultural 
org::u1.izatiotl in the Free State Ins alarmed me. ,,14 
It seelJ1S likely that so!ne of those who gravitated to the 
Ossewa-Brandwag were ignorant at first of the full range of its 
interests and activities. In late J-une of 193'0, in the Orange 
Free State, a certain Mr. Fiet Oosthuizen, hitherto a fairly 
prominent member of the Ossewa-Brandwag resigned from the 
organization, issuing at the same time a condemnation of its 
motives. Mr. Oosthuizen was known to be a st:3.unch Afrikaner 
and Republican, ~nd his resignation therefore contributed to the 
c1 im.ate of SlH3picion. surrou.nding the sO::levlh:3,t slla,lowy 
. t' 15 org:-111lZa lone 
A natural corollary of Nazi sentiment was anti-Semitism. 
The anti-Semitic ~ctivities of the Greyshirt and Blackshirt 
mOVejilents "'u,ve a1 '::'8 ~.dy been touche d ulJon, but it was ~1.ot on.ly 
these bodies on the lunatic fringe which attached the Jews. 
14. Rand Daily Nlail, IF August, 1~;3~j, p. 12. 
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'rhe Purified!';ation;:o,l Party in 1939 offiGLqlly adopteel Clrlti-
Semi tis~l1 as a party policy. This in the main was not so iflUch 
a thorough-going hatred of Jews as a shrewd political 
capi talization on the anti-Jevvish cu.rrent .!hich ·ca::::;e(l <lurin;:; ~;ht3 
Dr. Malan h~nself WiS not perso~~lly ~nti-3t3~itic, 
'l,S <;''I./'). be seen in his conciltatorJ :':l.f;f;it~lde wheel ~le c.'L::le GO 
po,iJer in 1948, but for the moment, anything which served to 
harm the gover-ament politically was grist to the mill. The 
Communist bogey also, although not a very gre::itt;hre:·it at i;llat 
tirrle, was 1:ttiliz811 i~l like I Fl.nner. 
-.vi th cynic'3..l anlU.se:!lent by a journalist, Charles ]'redericJc: 
"]:1he Communist gogga see·:1S to take on life here in me;3..sure wi ~h 
the 11rogress of Anglo-Russian pact negotiations. The creature 
is of a domestic political kind, and just now - wi~h ~ few by-
U-
elections in the offit1g - it may l~l:J.ve ~.L ~s U.:38::l. 11- 0 
~he Purified ~·~ation?cl :-'arty t s anti-SeUli tic pro.:,;.t:"'l.lJ.Jle 
~irstlJ, Jews of British 
extraction were seen as malevolent capitalists, hurrowing deep 
into the economy of South Africa to fill their own coffers, and 
in the process squeezing the life-blood ont of the ordi1:l':1.rJ 
citizen. Undoubtedly the3..curnen of JewiBh b').sines:1)ilen w.·} .. s an 
e;3ta"'olished f·1.ct, but in'tn expanding C01:tr:l try, ther('3 were iilany 
others of different races forging ahead. It was a gross 
exaggeration to depict the Jews as tyrants at the apex of South 
African econmaic life. 
pOit1t of view. 
'loou.nded in '''sports of his s'peeches concernillg "die jodevra.1.C." 
~is approach varied frruntoneG of cool reason to outright 
emotiOlc.al appeals such as the following: It. • • • •• die J ood ~].et 
t.n verdere eienskap, naamlik om mag te wil -L-~i toefen wat hy 
verl-:ry deur sy sake-talent en oneerlike metoleD. :~)urf ons 
stilsi t en toesien hoe hierdi8 vre,L~~elinee G.ie trood ui t die 
mond van ons kinders neem?" 17 In the wake of such remarks, Mr. 
Louw's reiterated assertion t~at he was a friend of the Jews 
and advised or..ly what would be in their interests, rang strangely 
in many earfjl. 
Another aspect of the attack was the opposition to 
Jewish immigration on the grounds of tbeir inassirllilabili ty. 
16. Forum, 19 August, 1~39, Vol. II, No. 21, p. 4. 
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It was charged that owing to an international outlook they 
could never become patriotic South Africans. An added fillip 
was the assertion that because of this international outlook the 
Jews had strong leanings towards Communism. "Die Jode is 
internasionaal in hul ui tkyk en da:lrom is hulle ook die hoofaan-
vaarders van die Kommunisme. Ook in ons land is dit die Jode 
wat hoofaanvaarders van die kommunisme is.,,18 Associated with 
this line of argument was a plea to halt Jewish immigration. 
Possibly stemming from the fear that incoming Jews would 
gravitate towards the United Party and swell its number~, the 
agitation against Jewish immigration was translated into 
legislative form by an Aliens Amendment and Immigration Bill 
introduced by Mr. Eric Louw on February 24, 1939. Jewish 
immigration had already been curtailed in an Aliens Bill two 
years previously, but Mr. Louw's bill sought to terminate such 
immigration entirely, and also to apply various discriminatory 
measures to Jews already resident_in the Union. 19 It was 
generally condemned as a blatant anti-Semitic instrument, and 
was forthwith rejected in Parliament, with only seventeen 
members voting in favour of it. Apparently however, the 
Nationalists derived some benefit from it in the form of support 
from certain of the rural areas. 20 
The third aspect of the attack was that the Jews wished 
to wreak vengeance on Germany, and in doing so were prepared to 
drag South Africa into a war which did not concern her. 
According to Mr. Eric Louw: "In her hypocritical attitude 
England is being supported by the Press and International Jewry, 
who are out f'or revenge against Germany at all cost.,,21 
It is evident from all this that the National Party's 
anti-Semitic policy was a curious amalgam of anti-Imperialism 
and general anti-British feeling, as well as outright racialism, 
and it had an indirect bearing on the neutrality issue. 
Certainly political considerations were in large part 
responsible for the National Party's anti-Semitism. But what 
of the wave of genuine antagonism from which this political 
weapon drew its potency? Besides the propagandist activities 
18. Ibid. 
19. M. Kentridge, I Recall, p. 270. 
20. Round Table, June 1939, No. 115, P. 636. 











of the "Shirt l1 movements, there was also in existence an 
organization known as "The People's Movement," headed by H.S. 
Terblanche, with its headquarters in Cape Town. During the 
thirties, this body unleashed upon the South African population 
a veritable flood of anti-Semitic pamphlets. 22 
A manifestation of rabid anti-Jewish sentiment by a 
private individual, at this tin::.e, was contained in a book written 
by General Manie Maritz, entitled "My Lewe en Strewe." Some 
excerpts were so scurrilous that General Maritz was put on trial 
for a deliberate attempt to incite racial animosity. According 
to High Court Judge, Mr. Justice Hoexter, the book was "an 
excellent example of vile, venomous and contemptible racial 
propaganda." lViaritz was convicted and sentenced to a £75 fine, 
which he refused to pay. Committed to jail, he was released 
on 26 August, 1939 on payment of the fine. 23 
The Jewish Board of Deputies had been making strenuDus 
attempts throughout the thirties to combat anti-Semitic 
propaganda. A private organization with the same end in view, 
set up in 1939, was the Society of Jews and Christians, which 
put out a publication entitled ommon Sense. 24 
J.H. Hofmeyr also regarded the situation as sufficiently 
grave to warrant repeated warnings in speeches and articles 
throughout 1939. ego 
"There is much anti-Semitic propaganda of a 
secret nature taking place, which receives not 
only initial inspiration but also material from 
outside South Africa. Of that the essential 
significance is just this - that in other countries 
anti-Semitism has been used as both the precursor 
and the instrument of dictatorship - there are those 
who are ready to use it to subvert democratic 
institutions in our own land."25 
In assessing the attitude of the dirferent sections in 
South Africa regarding possible participation in the war, it is 
difficult to determine just how much Pro-Nazi feeling did exist. 
Most National Party Members who were accused of Nazi leanings 
were highly indignant. In July of 1939, for instance, the 
22. rr:. Cohen, Anti-Jewish Manifestations in the Union of South 
Africa during the Nineteen Thirties. p. 68. 
23. R~nd Daily Mail, 25 August, 1939, p. 7. 
24 • .l."orum, 15 July, 1939, Vol. II, No. 16, p. 4. 











leading Nationalists of the Gamtoos Valley were outraged 
when visited by detectives and informed that it had been alleged 
that they were promoting a petition requesting Hitler to come 
and take over South Africa. ifhe chairman of the National Party 
in the district, Mr. Ignatius Rautenbach, in an interview with 
the Press stoutly denied any such activity and asserted that 
the accusations had come from the United PartY,whiCh was bent 
on discrediting the neutrality policy of the National Party.26 
It was not unnatural that there should be aome pro-
German feeling in the country, since there were many Afrikaners 
of German extraction, whose attitude was far more likely to be 
sympathetic towards Germany ~han Britain. Also there had been 
a precedent set for goodwill towards Germany in the days of the 
old Transvaal Republic, when Germany had supported the efforts 
of Kruger and his Boers to fend off British Imperialism. 
However, it would be wrong to consider this historical and 
sentimental attachment as synonymous with a desire for actual 
co-operation with Hitler. It must also be remembered that the 
more sinister aspects of Nazidom were probably not fully grasped 
at this stage. It is in large part the revelations during the 
war and after that have led to the universal opprobri:rum in which 
Hitlerism is held. However it is also understandable that, in 
these anxious pre-war months, English-speaking South Africans, 
influenced on their side by their affiliations to England, should 
construe any sympathy with Germany as evidence of treason. 
Visits to Ge~lany by such people as Dr. Diedericks, Professor 
of Philosophy at the University of the Orange Free State, and 
TIr. J.F. Burger, Professor of EdUCation at Cape Town, caused 
suspicion when both Ken canie back with very favour'able reports on 
conditions in Germany. Dr. Burger particularly, was 
enthusiastic about the dedication of the young to their father-
land, and he advocated the introduction of some features of the 
German educational system) such as emphasis on physical training 
and open-air schools, in South Africa. Both men expressed the 
opinion that Germany was not anticipating or preparing for a 
war.27 
Another person who had visited Germany and Italy fairly 
recently was .Mr. Oswald Piro;w, the I~~inister of Defence. Of 
German extraction himself, he had been profoundly impressed by 
Hitler and the military might of Germany. Ir June, 1939, 
Pirow's daughter Elsie, went to Bavaria to work with peasant 
26. Die Burger, 5 July, 1939, p. 1. 











girls in a labour camp, stating that she felt tremendously drCl.wn 
to the country of her forefathers. 28 
In hearty support of Hertzog's neutrality policy, Pirow 
is considered by many South Africans to this day to have been a 
traitor. It is true that in 1940, he published a book 
entitled Nuwe Orde vir Suid Arrika which WaS in essence a plea 
~or National Socialism in South Afric~, but then, per~aps the 
bitterness of political defeat led him to excesses which he 
might otherwise not have contemplated. Certainly his behaviour 
during his term: of office as ]If;inister of De!"ence WaS not 
unpatriotic, and he had often been heard to say that in the event 
of war, every soldier was bound to fulfil his duty to his count~, 
regardless of his personal views regCl.rding the issue. He is 
also reported to have said ~hat one of the reasons why the 1914 
rebellion attained such serious proportions, was that the 
government had not prohibited subversive propagCl.nda, and that 
this time the same mistake would not be made - an interesting 
statement in view of his own subsequent activities. 29 A man of 
considerable intelligence ana administr~tive ability, Pirow 
remains something of an enigma. Perhaps he believed that 
totalitarianism represented ~he inevitable march of progress in 
the world of politics. Whatever his motivations, the 
inconsistencies of his character and his pronouncements led 
General Smuts to call him "a !"oolish and impetuous young man, 
utterly irresponsible and inclined ~o be mischievous. ,,30 
It is evident, by the attention given to prop~anda in 
South Africa, that Germany considered that there were those 
whose loyalties to their country ~nd ~o the British connection 
could be undermined. From 1933 onwards the German shortwave 
radio station, LJeesen, made regular broadcasts ~o South At·rica 
and to other parts of ~he Emp~re. Germany in 1939 had at least 
eight high-power short-wave ~ranslliitters, while the B.B.C. had 
six. Complaints were sometimes made thCl.t "~eesen is stronger 
than lJaventry.,,31 This was also because the B.B.C. had to 
cover all parts of the Empire, while ~ermany could concentrate 
on those parts which she particularly desired to impress. 
28. .t{CI.lld lJai1l Mail, 15 June, 1939, p. 7. 
29. G .A. IJ. Green, An Editor Looks Back, p. 205. 
30. Ibid, p. 205. 











S~nilar to the Lord Haw-Haw who aroused mingled derision and 
annoyance in Bri tain, '~Naughty-;Ji.aughty" disseminated pro-Nazi 
and anti-Semitic propaganda in South Africa. A large part of 
the material handled in these broadcasts was entirely fictitious. 
eg. on Saturday July 22nd, 1939, Zeesen broadcast an account of 
a meeting attended by 2,000 people in Pietersburg, at which a 
resolution was passed favouring a policy of neutrality in South 
Africa in the event of a war abroad. In fact no such resolution 
had been passed since there had been no meeting in Pietersburg on 
the night specified. 32 
The English broadcasts were relatively harmless, but the 
Afrikaans programmes were more dangerous. Full of popular 
appeal, they concentrated also on keeping alive the grievances 
of the Afrikaners against Britain. 33 South Africans with Nazi 
leanings were taken to Genn_any and used as broadcasters. Chief 
amongst these were a certain Kate Vos and a sometime Natal 
schoolteacher, ~rich Holm. 34 Holm was later captured and 
mprisoned for treasonable activities. 
J.&.~. S~pson, in his book South Africa Fights devotes 
some space to the Nazi threat in South Africa and South West 
At-rica, alleging that from 1933 onwards a constant stream of 
German Nationals filtered into the country. "Professors, under 
the guise of academic research, doctors pretending to be 
investigating new cures, toured the country, writing in their 
notebooks, not details of Bushmen paintings or rare African 
diseases, but plans of harbour works, bridges and utility 
services ••. 
A man called Ernest Bohle, son of a former Professor of 
Electrical Engineering at Cape Town University, apparently was 
responsible for a good deal of the Nazi activity in South 
Africa. 35 In his capqcity as head of the "League of Germans 
Abroad" he is alleged to have sent out what Rene Kraus descril1es 
32. 
33. 
Natal Mercurl, 24 July, 1939, p. 16. 
Rene Kraus, Old Master, The Life of Jan Christiar. Smuts, 
New York, 1944, p. 342. Vide also J.S.M. Simpson, South 
Africa Fights. 
34. J.S.M. Simpson, South Africa Fights, London, 1941, p. 13. 











as "droves" of N§.zi agents, who proceeded to infiltrate all 
Germ.an schools, Churches and businesses, reporting on those 
whose enthusiasm for the F-t;.hrer and what were sometimes called 
"c<;>ntemporary German icJe8~s", was not sufficiently manifest. 
A Gestapo agent called Diverge, visited the major cities of 
South Africa, gathering stray Germans into the fold by means of 
intimidation. He also investigated the German Legation and the 
Consulates to satisfy himself that Nazi ideals were being 
furthered in the proper manner. Dr. Leitner the German Minister 
Plenipotentiary was not the most influential official in the 
Nazi hierarchy. He was secretly subordinate to two agents· 
Jasper and LierSlit: of whom the latter was Consul-General. 36 
The above inforrn.ation DJ.ay be true, but it lacks 
substantiation, and the tone of both Simpson and Kraus is rather 
suspect. Certainly the numbers of German agents alleged to 
have been sent out to South Africa are exaggerated. While the 
two books perpaps give a distorted account of the extent of Nazi 
penetration in South Africa, there was undoubtedly cause for 
concern in South West Africa. 
In 1933 a flourishing Nazi Party arose in the territory. 
Apparently the Nazi insignia were displayed and there were 
meetings of the Hitlerjugend and torchlight processions of 
precisely the same type as those organized in Germany. Alarmed 
by these activities, the Union authorized a police raid on the 
Nazi headquarters in July 1934, as a result of which various 
documents were seized and the Nazi Party banned. Its 
territorial leader,Weigel, and the head of the Hitlerjugend, 
Lossnitzer,were expelled. 37 Nevertheless Nazi activity 
continued to flourish. 
In 1938 a Corr®ission had been appointed to investigate 
conditions in South West Africa. This Commission, consisting 
of Mr. Justice van der Heever, Mr. Justice van Zyl and Dr. 
Holloway, then Secretary for Finance, made some very interesting 
discoveries. Paragraph 270 of the report read as follows: 
"On the 7 February, 1934, the officer in charge 
of the organization of the Nazi Party in Hamburg 
sent out circular instructions for the swearing-in 
of all office bearers of that party, also abroad. 
The formula aas as follows: 'I swear that I will bear 
unbreakable allegiance to Adolf Hitler, and Yield 
unconditional obedience to leaders appointed by him 
over me."38 
36. Rene Kraus, OPe cit., p. 332-334. 
37. G.L. Steer, Judgement of German Africa, London, 1939, P. 115. 











The report also confirmed suspicions that German residents in 
South Africa and South West Africa who refused to give their 
allegiance to the Fuhrer would "be dealt with". The implication I 
of this sinister phrase, was that pressure would be brought to 
bear upon them by harming relatives still in Germany. Mr. 
Kentridge in his book I Recall states that it was as a direct 
result of this report that General Smuts, on 20th April, 1939, 
introduced the Police (S.W.A.) Bill to strengthen the Union's 
Forces in the Mandated Territory. J.S.Nf. Simpson indicates 
however that the government had heard on April 15th that there 
was to be an attempted putsch in South West Africa, timed to 
co-incide with Hitler's birthday. This was to take the form of 
a seizure of radio stations in Walvis Bay. Simpson asserts 
that this was the reason for Smuts's dispatch of policemen and 
armoured cars to the territory. Whatever the exact origin of 
Smuts move, it is certain that there was sufficient subversive 
activity to warrant action. 
The German Press reacted immediately, denouncing the 
action of the Union government as a "provocative violation of 
mandatory rights. n39 Leaders of the National Party were 
inclined to agree. Dr. Malan, for instance, stated that the 
sending of police reinforcements was a calculated move to 
frighten the Union population into enthusiasm for war. "1'ot 
vandag toe het ons nie gehoor wat in- Suidwes sebeur het wat die 
stuur van die polisie daarheen regverdig nie.,,40 Oswald Pirow, 
betraying considerable animus against General Smuts, was later 
to say of this affair. "How a coup d'etat would have suited 
General Smuts' war policy! ,,41 
One person who was very definitely relieved by the 
Government's action was Dr. D.G. Gonr~die, the Administrator of 
South West Africa. In an interview with the Press he said that 
he did not foresee any rising in South West Africa, and that the 
arrival of the detachment of South African police had definitely 
eased matters. 42 
39. J.~.M. Simpson, South Africa Fights, p. 26. 
40. Dia Volksblad, 25 AUgust, 1939, p. 7. 
41. o. Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog, ~ape Town, 1957, p. 243 











Another incident at this time which evoked considerable 
comment was the Union government's announcement on July 28th, 
1939 that it would henceforward govern the Caprivi Zipfel, a 
part of the mandate) directly from the Capital. The reason 
given for this was the difficulty of controlling the area 
satisfactorily. 43 although legally entitled to do this under 
the prOVisions governing ~he administration of Mandated 
territories, there was again a protes~ from Germany. The 
Nationalists while agreeing that the ~overnment was within its 
rights, accused the United Party of war-mongering. "Hierdie 
tyd, wanneer die gemoedere so prikkelbaar is, en regerings-
ondersteuners heelaag besig is om teen Duitsland op te heks, 
word spesiaal uitgesoek om die bestuur van die Caprivi-strook 
van Suidwes-Afrika weg te neem en regstreeks onder die Unie te 
plaas" said Dr. N.J. van der lVierwe. 44 
It was also discovered in July of 1939 that ~ermans 
who by the length of their residence in South West Africa had 
qualified for British Citizenship, were being prohibited by 
intimidation from applying for this citizenship.45 The Union 
Government had by this time made it very plain indeed that Nazi 
activity in South West africa would not be tolerated - yet there 
was a discernible defiance and arrogance displayed by some of 
the more fiery Nazis. Dr. von Oelhoven, rormer German Consul 
had the temerity to say at a meeting of' German youth Athletes: 
"If you trust the Fuhrer-Land rely on him, he will keep his pledge 
and liberate us in South West Africa.,,46 As late as August 14th 
1939, meetings of the Hitler youth and The League of German 
Maidens were still taking place in Swakopmund. 47 • 
Another testimonial to Nazi sympathies amongst Germans 
in South west Africa w~s a statement in the newly-founded news-
paper of the Deutsche Verlag Company. This had come into being 
by the amalgamation of the Windhoek Algemeine ~eitung and the 
Swakopmund Deutsche Boebachter. The director of the new company 
was Herr E. Dressel, the leader of the Deutsche Suidwes Bulld, and 
43. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1937 - 1940, p. 3170 
44. Die Vo1ksblad, 19 aUgust, 1939, p. 1. 
45. Rand Daily Mail, 28 July, 1939, p. 12. 
46. J.S.M. Simpson,South Africa Fights, p. 23. 











he stated that the paper would serve "to combat t~e lying 
campaign and enmity directed at the German People, the Third 
Reich, and our Fuhrer." The declaration ended with the words 
"Heil Hitler.,,48 
It is interesting that despite the goverrunent's 
knowledge of the consideraole Nazi unrest in South West AIri~a, 
no mention was made of it in the Union's ~nnual report to the 
League of Nations. The omission was so singular that the 
permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations registered 
a complain~ that the political situation had hardly been sketched 
Perhaps, in view" of the constant cry of the German Governrllent 
concerning what it referred to as "violation of mandator.! I'ights~ 
the South.AIrican Government thought it prudent to omit any 
contentious issues. 49 
Simpson has alleged that Nazi infiltration also took 
place in the economic sphere, GenIi.an Nationals insinua.ting 
themspl ves into positions of trust. 'l'his may have been so, but 
more interesting for the purposes of this essay is an examination 
of the attitude of South African subjec~s regarding trade with 
Germany. 
A part of German econo",nic policy in South Africa at this 
time, was the lowering of tenders for various cOillDlodities, so as 
I 
to make them more attractive to the buyer. German tenders 
throughout this period were consistently lower than those of any 
other country. The decision to accept or reject these tenders 
ceased to be a matter of mere economic profit and loss, but 
became a burning patriotic issue. There were many who felt t:'1at 
loyalty demanded preference for British goods, regarJless of 
enticing German offers, and there were also those who rebelled 
at the thought of preferential treatment for 5ritain. One of 
the most Signal examples of loyalty above gain, was the Cape 
Town Municipality's decision to re ject a low German ten(ler for 
the supply of electric9.1 equipment in favour of a higher British 
one. The German Minister Plenipotentiary immediately lodged 
a complaint with the government, whereupon the Secretary for 
External Affairs, Dr. TI.D.J. Bodenstein wrote to the Town Clerk 
of Cape 'rown, requesting information as to the reasons behind 
the rejection of the German tender. There was an immediate 
48. Rand Daily Mail, 4 July, 1939, p. 10 











protest at what was felt to be unwarranted governmental 
interference in a purely private concern. The Labour Leader, 
Mr. W. B. Madeley, said in parliament: "I resent the atti t~J.de 
of the Prime Minister and others in endeavourin6 to sit upon 
local authorities because they dare to feel that they have some 
right to express themselves in acts or words.,,50 
'rhe Cape Town Municipality issued a curt refus;ll to "Dr. 
Bodenstein on June 20th, stating that "'..ehe Council is unable to 
appreciate the authority in terms of which the request for 
information is preferred." 51 In SCille quarters this ste.nd tal\:en 
by the Municipality was hailed as a loyal and proudly independent 
action. There were others whose interest in the matter was not 
patriotism, but a more mundane fear that the rejection of the 
German tender would provoke retaliation. Certain wool-farmers 
viewing this prospect with trepidation, decided to boycott the 
Cape Town wool market. 52 
Other town councils fell in behind Cape Town in 
pursuance of this minor economic warfare. On 3rd July the 
Nigel Town Council refu.sed to consider any German products for 
a project to lay steel piping in one of the nines. On August 
26th the Durban City Council rejected five German tenders for 
electric cable and pipes manufactured in Bohemia la German 
protectorate), accepting instead Bri tisl! tenders which werei:lOre 
expensive by £1,149. 53 
'J:1he Malani tea were ra.anifestly disgusted by -tlhase 
,patriotic demonstrations. Vrhen a proposal was mooted in the 
Transvaal Provincial Council tor preferential treclt:raerlt to 
Britain regarding the purchase of provincial supplies, several 
~':alani tes walKed out of the Council Chamber in protest. kr. 
D.C. de Wet liel then lVi.P. for WonderbooIn\who elected to stay, 
made a statement in favour of buying the cheapest goods 
regardless of country of origin, stating at the same time that 
the Union was Britain's greatest "milch cow" and if more 
sensible economic policies were followed in South Africa, the 
incidence of poor-whi teism would be correspondingly lower. I~e 
also suggested that steps should be taken to curtail the "bUY 
Bri tish" campaign of' the municipalities. 54 
50. Dand. TIail;z r{ail, 14 June, 1939, p. 13. 
51. Rand TIail;z Mail, 29 June, 1939, p. 20. 
52. Die :SUr~er, 26 July, 1939, p. 1. 
53. Rand Dail;z Mail, 26 August, 1939, p. 11. 











This may have been the or1.g1.n of subsequent rumours 
that the Prime Minister intended to induce recalcitrant 
municipalities to accept German tenders. It seems that the 
English-speaking section 'was only too ready to impute 
autocr~tic designs to General Hertzog. However, as he himself 
pointed out, the government had no constitutional power to force 
the municipalities to do anything against their wishes. 
While some South Africans felt that they were being 
forced to buy British goods, others claimed that South Africa 
was being forced by the Government to favour German goods. 
It was true that at this time, there was an existing trade 
agreement between South Africa end Germany. In reply to 
criticisim levelled in this connection, United Party spokesmen 
said that the barter agreement had no particular political 
significance, but ensured an increase of Union exports without 
affecting German exports to the Union. vVhen proposals were 
considered for another trade agreement with Germany, the fear 
was expressed in diplomatiC and business circles in London that 
dangerous German penetration could result in South Africa with 
adverse effects on Britain's trade and South African security.55 
Another goverr~ent financial arrangement which met with 
opposition from English-speaking ~outh Africans was the taxing 
of imported cars on a weight basis. Nir. Madeley stated in 
parliament that this system favoured Germany. The reply of the 
Minister of Finance, Mr. Havenga, which was based on concrete 
facts and figures, did nothing to allay the fears of English-
speaking advocates of discriminatory measures against Germany. 
"Our trade with Germany is of the greatest importance to this 
country," he said. 56 
o 0 0 0 000 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
One of the most faSCinating aspects of the struggle 
over the neutrality issue is, as has been indicated, the part 
played by party politics. A di:t'ficult task, however, in 
unravelling and isolating the motivations of the various sectors, 
is the separation of real motives as opposed to expedient 
political attitudes. In some cases a part of the story is the 
plain stubbornness of the diametrically opposed. 
Apart from the historical antagonis.m, and the diversity 
in the heritages of the two main white groups in South Africa, 
and the undoubted universal preoccupation with the possibility 
of war, there existed the realities of practical politics. The 
55. Die Volksblad, 10 August, 1931, p. 1. 











United Party was in power, the Purified National Party wished to 
be. In consequence the utterance s of both parties concerning 
anti-Semitism, Pro-Nazi feeling, autocratic practices and economic 
discrimination were bound to be influenced by such considerations 
as popular appeal to potential voters. This is not to suggest 
that the entire important issue of the Second World War became a 
mere ring for political pugilists, but nevertheless, -one would 
have thought that with the actual outbreak of war, everything 
else would have been submerged in the face of a larger problem. 
Perhaps South Africa was the only Dominion in which the outbreak 












During August, 1939 the tension in I:)outh Africa mounted 
as the overseas situation worsened. Amidst the feverish 
political activity of these days, General I:)muts counselled 
calm. At a meeting in Clocolan on August ~4 he advised his 
anxious listeners and South Afric2- as a whole, to stand together, 
for it was only as a united country that the right choice could 
be made. Every I:)outh African citizen must stand by the 
government whatever its decision, he added. l Pleas of this 
nature, however sagacious were virtually useless at this time in 
view of the hardened opinion of both the pro- and anti-neutrality 
factions. On August 28, Malan was still reiterating his call 
for a general election to decide the issue, and i::)enator Clarksoll, 
ironically enough was declaring with great emphasis that reports 
of a proposed neutrality stand by the Prime Minister were utterly 
unfounded and amounted to libel. "The stand General Hertzog has 
taken in international affairs is the same as that taken by the 
Dominion of Canada, and no-one doubt's Ganada' s 10yal1jY," he 
said. 2 
One would have thought that the prospect of an in@inent 
war would have absorbed all the energies of South African 
citizens, but in the last week of August, the Malanites found 
time to mount a campaign in favour of South Africa's currency 
being cut adrift from sterling. They demanded that I:)outh At'rica 
produce its own currency and quote its own foreign exchange 
without reference to sterling. 3 This evidently was part of the 
movement towards independence of all things British. 
The last week of August also saw a press proposal for a 
formatior: of a National government. A suggestion flooted was 
the inclusion of Colonel Stallard, Dr. r.r:ala.n and r:jr. N:adeley in 
an "inner cabinet". The prospect of such a cabinet achievin~ 
any degree of success seems very ren:ote but ill any case 1he: prpposal 
ca:me to nothing. 4 
The Union hegan to prepare for a state of National 
emergency. On August 25 leaves of men in the Perr;mneEt Foree 
::md the Police- Force were cancelle d, and those already on 
holiday were rec'::clled. ESf5ential services and industrial key-
1. Rand Dail;y: N:ail, 24 August, lS39, p. 7. 
2. Rand Dail;y: Iv" ail , 26 August, 1939, p. 11. 
3. Rand Dail;y: Nail, 29 August, 1939, p. 10. 











points were gua:->:'ded by special constables detailed for that 
purpose. At Broadcast House a day and a night guard were 
maintainecl, as was the case at the Drill Hall, Johannesburg. 
According to the Rand Daily Mail of August 26, police were 
undertaking intensive investigations into subversive activities, 
checking their files, and keeping a close watch on suspects. 
In the mearJt:iJne, the military headquarters at 
Voortrekkerhoogte was a scene of diligent activity. Personnel 
were working up to sixteen hours a day, transferring ammunition 
from the various magazines to the :Voortrekkerhoogte depot and 
attending to other necessary tasks. Consignments of bombs and 
other fir-munition were heing sent to the coastal cities, while 
members of the Permanent Force left for unknown destinations. 5 
According to Brigadier E.P. Hartshorn in his book 
Avenge Tobruk, the scene at the Drill Hall in Johannesbure was 
somewhat di:t"ferent. There members of the Active Citizen Force 
mille d about, :iJopa ttently awaiting mobilization orders, Clll(l 
cor,r;enting darkly 011 what they considered tbe extreme 
nonchalance of the. Defence Department in view of the impending 
crisis. 
111 Simonstown barbour, three ships of the British Africa 
Squadron were standing by, alert for instant dellarture. Another 
three had left for destinations unknown. In fiape 'fown l--Jarbour 
undeI' sOTnewhat different cirC1;:IDstances another ship was also 
leaving. This was the German Liner "Windhuk" of the GerInan-
Africa line. Her captain, a man called Brauer, decided tbat 
in view of the tense si tl:.ation it would be imprudel1t to tarry, 
and the "Windhuk" departed in such haste that if left a good 
many passengers behind. 6 
In South West Africa precautionary measures were also 
being undertaken. There was a call for 200 volunteers to act as 
special constables in case of emergency. 
rrne ordinaty South African citizen went about his or her 
daily business, ears attuned whel1.ever possible to the news 
broadcasts on the wireless. There was a hiatus, a sort of 
anxious hovering, compounded of uncertainty, dread, and in some 
cases eagerness for combat. Though the scene of inilldnent 
conflict was many thousands of miles away, South africa, as much 
as any other courltry, trembled on the brink. But General 
Hertzog kept silent. Parliament was not in session at the time 
and the Frime IV,inister had retired to his farm. Leslie 
5. Die Volksblad, ~6 AUgust, 1939, p. 1. 











Blackwell M.P., suddenly realized that the Senate's term of 
office was due to expire on 5 September, and unless a special 
session of parliament was called immediately to extend the life 
of the Senate, there would be no legal Senate in office during 
this critical period. Blackwell alerted Smuts, who in turn 
reminded Hertzog of thiB odd lapse in the constitutional 
machinery. A special session was dlJly called for September 2. 
It has sometimes been suggested that this calling of 
Parliament had been a lucky accident and that it had nothing to 
do with the international crisis, caused by Hitler's invasion of 
Pol2nd. As Mr. Harry Lawrence bas pointed out, the speecb 
given by the Governor-General at the opening of the special 
session on September 2 indicates quite definitely that the 
SUlTlllOl1ing of parliament bad a definite bearing on the situation 
overseas: 
"In view of the grave international situation it n1ight 
become necesnary for Parlia.r(.ent to Il~eet before such 
reconstitution (i.e. of the Senate) has taken place. 
In order to render this possible it is deemed necessary 
to extend the period of office of Senators ...•• "7 
Various people, finding it strange that the expiry of 
the Senate should have been forgotten, suspected that Hertzog 
had deliberately done nothing about it, in the hope that he could 
then declare South Africa rleutral without anyb:Lndrance from 
Parliament. Deneys Reitz for instance, in his book No Outs;pan 
postulates the theory that had it not been for the Senate 
extension, Hertzog would have succeeded in declaring South Africa 
neutral without recourse to Parliament. However, it seems ~,. 
certain -that the Senate lapse was a genuine overEight, and the 
chari table view would be that Hertzoe:, had not said anything 011 
the subject of the international situation because he had 
thought that the present crisis was another of Ei tIer's bluI'fs. 
By 1 September nearly all the recalled llE.P.'s had 
converged upon Cape Town, and speculation was rife amongst them, 
now that war had actually broken out, as to what the l-~ext few 
days would bring. li- .H. Wilson a reliorter on tIle staff of tIte 
Cape Times had spoken to both Senator A.P.J. Fourie and Vr. 
Owwald Firow about the international si tuatioll a week (Jefore 
Parliament had met. Mr. Wilson understood them both to be 
taking it for granted that should Germany invade roland, South 
Africa wOlJld he at war wi tl1in Fi few clay[~. e It is pOBsi ble 
7. Sunday Times, 2 AUgUst, 1964, p. 12. 










that Mr. Wilson misunderstood what was said. If he did not, 
then there is addedmyst"ery concerning Hertzog's relations with 
his colleagues at this time. It seems incredible that a"t this 
late stage Hert~og had not even spoken to Pirow, who was one of 
the most intima"te of his associates, about his policy in the 
event of war. 
Parliament met at 10.30 a~m. the next morn~g, 2nd 
September, 1939. After the usual procedures for the opening of 
Parliament had been completed, Dr. Malan, Mr. Marwick 
(representing the Dominion Party) and Mr. Madeley (representing 
the Labour Party) asked the Prime Minister what the attitude of 
his government was towards the international crisis. Hertzog 
replied that he could give no answer until he had consulted his 
caoinet. Formal notice of the Senate ex"tension bill was then 
given and approved. ~muts introduced the second reading and 
Parliament was then adjourned until Monday 4"th ~eptember. 
It must have been after the proceedings in Parliament 
that Malan and Hertzog conferred at Groote ~chuur. ~he import 
of "the meeting, it transpired, was an agreement ohat if Hertzog 
permitted a full aiscussion of the neutrality issue, Malan would 
see to it that his supporters would allow speedy passage of the 
~enaoe Bill. 9 Some suspect that it was then that Malan made a 
guarantee of support for a policy of neutrality. However, it 
has been amply substantiated that the offer of support was not 
made until Sunday morning when Mr. Paul Sauer carried a letter 
to Hertzog. lO Just as Malan was leaving, ueneral Smuts arrived, 
and according to G.A.L. Green, Smuts suspected "then that there 
were stormy times ahead. ll 
By 3 p.m. all of the thirteen Cabinet J\liillisters had 
assembled at Groote Schuur. They were ushered into the 
drawing-room where ueneral Hertzog awaited them. When all 
were seated in a semi-circle, Hertzog began to speak. ""I am. 
going to remain neutral and under no circumstances aLlow South 
AIrica to enter this war," he said.l~ Pacing up and down, he 
spoke for more than an hour, enlarging upon the theme of the 
injustices of Versailles, and his conviction that Hitler was not 
aiming at world domination. He did not visualize any altera"tion 
of South Africa's relatlons with the Commonwealth; and South 
9. Rand Daily Mail, 2 September, 1939, p. 10. 
10. Vide Roberts and ~rollip, The South Afric~n Opposition, 
1939 - 194), Cape Town, 1947. Also Hansa~union House of 
Assembly debates, 4 September, 1939, Vol. I, p. 45. 
11. G.A.L. Green, An Editor Looks Back, Cape Town, p. 206. 
12. Rand Da~ly Mail, 14 September, 1939, p. 10. From an 











Africa would honour her agreement with Britain regarding the 
Simonstown Naval base, but more than this was impossible. 
When Hertzog had stated his views, one or two of his 
colleagues spoke in support of what he had said. General 
Kemp, particularly, was emphatiQ that if Sout:l Africa did not 
remain neutral "there will De a blood-bath in Soubh Africa. II13 
General Smuts, who had been sitting quietly on a sofa opposite 
Harry Lawrence, then began to speak. Saying that this was the 
most serious decision that he had ever had to face, he explained 
the reasons behind his conviction that South AfricA. should 
support Britain and declare war on Gentiany. He did not agree 
that a policy of participation would lead to a bloodbath, as ha,d 
been prophesied. AS Minister of Justice, he was in 
to know whether any such danger existed, he said. 14 





The discussion lasted for approximately four hours, 
of the th:ijrleen cabinet ministers 
, 
during which time each 
expressed his views. It bec3JIle clear that there W:.3.S a definite 
split in the cabinet over the war issue. Mr. Havenga, T;lr. 
Pirow, General Kemp, ;:jena,;or ~'ourie, and Mr. Fag:3.n supported 
the Prime Minister. Those supporting Smuts were: volonel 
.iJeneys Reitz, Colonel Collins, Mr. H.H. Henderson, rilr. Harry 
Lawrence, Nr. Stuttaford, and Senator Clarkson. 15 It had been 
a gruelling session, and as it was growing late, t:reneral Hertzos 
adjourned the meeting until the next day, Sunday, 3 September. 
According to Deneys Reitz, everyone was "wor;:i out" .16 
OSW3.1d Pirow, writing about this cabinet !;teeting in 
later yeilrs, managed to convey a very different impression of 
what the meeting had been like. According to him it was General 
Smuts who had been long-winded, rather than Hertzog. 1I]~hat 
:c"'.fternoon he (General :Tertzog) wasted no ti:ne in beating about 
the bush. "Well gentlemen, war may be declared tOGlOrrOW, I 
take it we stand by the policy of neutrality, so clearly l:3.id 
dOWYl a year ago.' There was an embarassed silence, and then 
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it see:18 as if :-Tarry Lawrence's account of thisneeting is the 
~ore accurate one. 
The next morning 'Tarry Lawrence and various other 
United Party members breakfasted with General Smuts at his club. 
Smuts declined to tall.\: about what was in progress in the cabinet-
:neetings, cOijInlenting instead on the beauty of -I;he Spring flowers 
and his proposed visit to Kirstenbowch later that l~lorning. 11:3 
After breakfast Smuts g,nd Harry Lawrence went to Smuts's ')edroorn. 
at the club, g,nd discussed the sittl.'.ltion. Smuts produced a 
rOt1Zh draft of the motion he intended to present in Parliament .19 
He must have worked on it the previous night. 
ff:e9.nwhile, the Malani t8S had beenleeting at Dr. :i;alan IS 
home in Sea Point to decide on their best course of action. 
'rhey sent the Party Whip, Mr. Paul Sauer to Hertzog, with a 
letter offerinG their sUpi;ort if he declarec1 a policy of' 
')" 
neutrali ty ._v 
The Cabinet h:3.d arrangeL't to Jileet at !~ p.m. on Sunday 
afternoon, but there was some change of plan, and some of the 
Ministers were called away from lunch to meet at Groote Schuur 
shortly after 1 p.m. 21 This time the meeting was relatlvely 
short. General Hertzog made it clear that he Vlould put his 
views bet'ore the House the following day, '.::ind General Smuts 
replied that he planned to :a'3.ke a connter proposal. 
"It was (Harry Lawrence remembered) in many respects, a 
sad occasion, for we had reacher1 the p'J.rting of the ways. After 
Colonel Reitz had thanked General Hertzog for the courtesy he 
had invariably shown those who had served under him, and expresse 
the hope that"the personal friendships we made would not be 
'lffected oy v{h'?~t had happened, we all dran~\: some sherry, shoo~~ 
22 h8.nds, and left on our respective ways." 
'rhat night Dr. Malan visited General Hertzog, and 
learned for himself that the Prime Minister W'3.S in favour of 
neutrality. Hertzog seemed convinced that he would obt9.in a 
,.llajori ty for his proposal. Perhaps thif3 was why he Jid (lot 
lB. Harry Lawreace in Su.nday Times, 2 August, 1964, p. l~~. 
1J. Ibid 
20. Roberts qnd Trollip, The South African Oppositio3, p. 18 
21. Cape Argus, 3 September, 1939, SpeIJial Edition, I). 1. 











think it necessary to take the matter to the party C3.uous. 23 
It seems odd that on an issue of such importance as this, 
General Hertzog did not take steps to ~scert~in ~s far as was 
possible, the exact extent of his support. It see::as 11.::131y 
that :~ertzog' s supporters did ellza.:3e in ;3011e catly"ci,s'~;ing. '3. Te. 
Long spe?.i(s of "l:'lYish promises" made on Hertzog's "beh], l f to 
those whose votes were considered to be uncertain, but offers 
no additional details. Hertzog himself had no :IT:.owledge of 
these promises. 24 
That same Sill1day evening, General Smuts and his six 
cabinet supporters were discussing his draft resolution in a 
private rOOF at the Civil Service Club. 25 Louis Baselen, the 
Secretary of the United Party was also present. By virtue of 
his pozoition he was better attuned than most to party opinion, 
and he made an estimate of the SUP1)Ort he thought Smuts was 
likely to receive. Colin Steyn also compiled an estill1ate, as 
did various journalists. Exactly what these estimates were 
cam10t be ascertained. In any case, as Hancock has pointed out, 
it was doubtful whether anyone could have predicted the outcome 
of the debate with absolute accuracy.26 
H.J. May, in his book Red Wine of Youth (p. 262) asserts 
that General Smuts had asked Colin Steyn how many votes he would 
get. Steyn is said to have replied that there were five 
doubtful votes. May avers that Steyn interviewed the five 
during the course of the week-end, and convinced them that they 
should vote for Smuts. It is doubtful whether this information 
is to be taken at face value. The only other statement which 
can be found in support of it is r/[orris Kentridge' s opinion that 
"Dr. Colin Steyn largely contributed to securing a majority for 
General Smuts' amendment.,,27 and even then, Kentridge appears 
to have beenreferring to the lobbying whiah took place on the 
actual day of the Parliamentary debate. 
On Monday morning, September 4, just before the sitting 
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lobby as rumours of the cabinet split spread. After the usual 
formalities, General Hertzog rose to speak, and there was an 
expectant hush, as people leaned forward eagerly to hear what 
the Prime Minister's attitude in this crisis was to be. He 
began by informing the House of the Uabinet split which had 
taken place over the weekend. It was quite clear from what he 
said that this split was irreconcilable, and although everyone 
was primarily interested in the neutrality issue which had caused 
the split, the realization that an era had come to an end must 
have fallen with some impact on the silent house. There were 
many who had not been disillusioned by Fusion and to these the 
wreckage of a great experiment must have occasioned regret. 
But at that instant there was no time thus to reflect. In 
later years some were to look back on Fusion as a golden era of 
prosperity and tranquillity, but at that moment the decision 
which Parliament was to make for war or peace absorbed all 
attention to the exclusion of subsidiary considerations. 
Without further ado Hertzog proceeded to read to the 
House a neutrality motion which dit"fered very little from the 
statement he had read to the Cabinet in 1938 at the time of the 
Munich crisis. 28 The gist of it was that ~outh Africa should 
remain neutral, but should nevertheless observe her obligations 
to Britain regarding the naval base at Simonstown and any other 
existing contracts between the two countries pertaining to South 
Africa's position in the Commonwealth. In the middle of this 
statement, the lJominionite Mr. Marwick,obviously under the 
. 20 stress of great emotion, cried out "Sh9llle! It ~s treason!" ..J 
Hertzog elaborated on the reasons for his decision, 
stating that the Union with its small population of 2,000,000 30 
could not offer more support than the t"ulfilment of her 
obligations in regard to the ~imonstown naval oase. There was 
a note of plaintiv~ess. in the Prime Minis~er's speech when he 
maintained that until the present time he had always been led to 
believe that his colleagues in the government concurred fully 
with his own view that South Africa should not go to war unless 
~B. 0ee Chapter one. 
29. Hansard, Union House of Assembly Debates, 4 September, 1939, 
Vol. XXXVI, p. 18. 











her interests were directly threatened. If they disagreed 
why had they not informed him of their opinions? "I maintain 
.......• that I do not deserve this, and that my colleagues who 
are at one with me do not deserve to be left in the lurch at a 
cri tical time like this, as has been done." 31 'rhis statement, 
if it was a candid view, was rather puzzling since although 
Smuts had agreed witt. the Prime I{inister a year previously, he 
had since changed his mind, and had made no secret of his opinion 
that South Africa should participate with Britain in the event of 
war. The newspapers had for months been full of the statements 
to this effect by :.:>muts and his supporters in the Cabinet. It 
was true, perhaps, that Smuts had not formally informed Hertzog 
of his change of heart, but his attitude had been so manifest 
as to have rendered such a formal statement needless. Neverthe-
less Pirow, IIavenga, Ke,mp and Hertzog were always to maintain 
that they haQ been wilfully deceived. 
Asserting that he had always honoured his trust to both 
sections of the nation, IIertzog enlarged upon the theme of South 
Al-rican independence wi thin the Ilri tish Commonwealth. Up to 
t;his poi::::lt his address had been reasoned and persuasive, but 
sudderllY his entire tone changed. Expressing his feeling that 
South Africans were a free, independent pe01)le, he was 
interrupted by the interjection of a bacl{-bencher. "Who gave 
you that freedom?" said Mr. n. J. du 'roi t, and in saying so, 
wrought something of more importance than rLe knew. Always 
impatient of opposition, Hertzog grew visibly angry, and 
launched upon a defellce of Eitler and Germany which left the 
House literally gasping. 32 Reiterating the old Malanite cry 
that South Africa had nought to do with a war between Poland and 
Germany, Hertzog inquired of the House whether, if South Africa 
did not take a firm stand now, there would ever be an end to 
South Africa's reluctant participation in British wars. 'Nhile 
it was true that Britain had certain obligations towards Poland, 
South Africa had no such obligations. "1': ow it is urged that we 
should take part in the war because the Gennan Chancellor has 
demonstrated that he is out to obtain world domination. Let 
me say this. I have carefully followed his actions step by 
step, and I have asked myself where is the proof that this man is 
out for world domination?"33 In his opinion, said Hertzog, 
31. Hansard, Vol. Y>.XXIV, 4 September, 1939, p. 20. 
32. L. Blackwell, l!'arewell to Parli:3.ment, pp. 59 - 60. 











there was no such proof. 
Resurrecting the oft-debated issue of the injustices 
of Versailles, Hertzog dwelt upon the humiliations and hardships 
which the German people had suffered, equating them with South 
Africa's experiences at the hands of Britain. 34 This reference 
to Versailles in late 1939 was a case of flogging a dead horse, 
since Germany had long since recouped her losses and .been aided • 
in her reconstruction by relaxation and ultimate cessation of 
her reparation payments. She had also been granted extensive 
loans by the United States, and had been recognized as a power in 
her own right in the League of Nations. The working of Hertzog~ 
mind at this stage was quite transparent. Filled with the 
resentment caused by Mr. du Toit's interjection, all of his old 
bitterness against Britain had risen up, and coupled with a 
sentimental attachment to the old Geniany of his forefathers, had 
produced this emotion-charged language. There are those who 
took this speech as proof that Hertzog was pro-Nazi. Smuts 
himself, in the heat of the moment described the speech as 
worthy of the Fuhrer himself. But, in sober reflection, what 
could this upright and honest, if arrogant, old gentleman have 
had in common with Adolf Hitler? Hertzog's and many others' 
attachment to Germany was not generated by enthusiasm for Hitler 
as such, but by his associations with the old Germany, the 
country which had produced a Wagner, a Schiller, a Goethe; the 
country which had a traditional link wf friendship with the 
Boers in South Africa. His expressions of fellow-feeling with 
Hitler resulted from the old wounds of the Anglo-Boer war and 
before, when he too had felt the need to rise up and triumph in 
the face of oppression. 
The Prime Minister expressed his conviction that to 
enter a war would jar the Afrikaner section so Violently that it 
would take many years to erase the resultant bitterness, and 
ended his address by formally proposing his neutrality resolution. 
It was seconded by Mr. Tom Naude. 35 
Hertzog's speech naturally alienated the entire English-
speaking section, and delighted the Malanites. But what of the 
others, the undecided members who were really in a quandary as to 
which course would be the right one? In the voting on this issue 
every vote was to be of significance in tilting the balance, and 
eloquent persuasiveness in this instance was a factor of 
34. Ibid, p. 22. 











incalculable importance. Simply by what people said, the 
balance of opinion could be swung so as to affect an entire 
nation. There were other speeches to follow, but it seems 
certain that Hertzog's speech had alienated many people of 
diverse political persuasions. 
Smuts '$ address, which followed directly on Hertzog's, 
was a masterpiece of clarity add shrewd psychological insigh~. 
at the outset he asked the House to dismiss everything except 
this grave national crisis from their minds. 
"I do not look upon this as a debating occasion. 
I do not look upon it as an occasion to ruIfle 
feelings or to set emotions going in this country. 
I simply want to state as clearly, and as simply 
and as objectively as I can, the points of dif'ference 
at issue."36 
With a careful avoidance of emotive language he stated that it 
was his considered opinion that South Africa should sever 
relations with Germany and treat her as an enemy, but he did not 
envisage active par~icipation overseas. There would be enough 
to do on the f'rontiers at home. 'l'his was an extremely shrewd 
move since for many the thought of sending the country's young 
men to serve and possibly to die overseas prevented any thought 
of supporting ~ritain. Mr. F.U. Erasmus was to say later in the 
debate tllat this assurance was merely the sugar around the pill. 
In a sense he was right. 37 
Another telling point was Smuts's dissection of the 
Prime Minister's neutrality resolution. Pointing out that 
modified neutrality was unknown in international law, Smuts 
expressed Ghe conviction that if Hertzog's proposal was adopted 
South Africa would fall between two stools and Ghat in ~he end 
the country would have to take sides anyway, in circumstances 
which were not likely to be favourable to her. 'fhere was logic 
in Smuts plea that it would be wiser simply to sever relations 
with Germany and treat her as an enemy in accordance witl1 
international law. 
In reply to Hertzog' s statement that South Africa had 
no interest in a war between Britain and trermany over Danzig, 
the deputy-Prime Minister gave a succint analysis of the issues 
over which the war was being fought~ Danzig he said, was 
36. Hansard, 4 September, 1939, Vol. T.KXVI, p. 25. 













merely a Ga:'lus belli, an i:rJl.TJlediate cause, underlying which was 
Hitler's desire for world domination. While Hertzog had 
painted a picture of a German stru.ggle to regain what was 
legitim8.tely hers, Smuts pOinted out that Hitler's forcible 
seizure of Czechoslovakia had L)een an act of aggression '3.g::l.inst 
8. country whicYl had no possible connection wi t~l Germany. It 
was qui te conceivable that Hi tIer in the future might conterllplate 
such a step against South Africa. n,l'o me it is quite clear that 
we are not dealing with a far-away problem in Easterrl Europe. 
We are dealing with a nation whose policy not only today, !Jut 
tOlilorrow may touch us vitally in this country.,,38 
Smuts did mention the desirability of loyalty to the 
coymnonweal th, but he concentrated upon proving that entry into 
the war was in South Africa'S interests, emphasizing that in 
view of such f lctors as the ·weakness of :3outh A.frica' s defence, 
th.e tempt:3..tion offered by her rich resources, and the position 
of South West Afriua on her borders, it would be foolish. for 
South Africa to stand aloof from the (Jommonwealth. 
'fhere vms one more fSl.r which Smuts felt it necessary to 
allay before proceeding wi th his 8.lIlendillent to Hertzog's proposal. 
Ee assured the House and the country at large that in his 
capaci ty as ~!:inister of Justice, he lUlew t:mt the alleged 
d~ngers atteildmt upon a declaratio'l of war wel~e :t:·or thellO;3t 
.p;.:u.:-t exag.;erated.\.l tt.ouch he did not ~3.ctually say so in so 
many words, 3mut[; was really telling the Eouse that there would 
not "oe a civil '.var in South Africa if the country decided to vote 
for participation. :;J'or some ellie past there had been dark 
mutters in certain quarters about another rebellion such as had 
occurred in 1914. It has even been alleged that there was a 
plot afoot to frighten Smuts so badly with threats of a civil 
war that he would be forced to vote for neutrality, and that his 
supporters, who would be repelled by his action, would desert 
him. Smuts would then be crushed and Hertzog would rule without 
him. 39 This appears to be a gross exaggeration, but neverthe-
less it was true that there were rumours of a possible civil war. 
Smuts's speech had been fairly simple in tone, but when 
the precision and logic of it are examined it is seen to contain 
a very sophisticated kind of simplicity. Smuts ar.aendment was 
as follows: 
38. Hansard, 4 September, 1939, Vol. XXXVI, p. 28. 













"To omit all the words after Bthat" 'J..nd to 
substitute "this House declares that the policy 
of the Union in this crisis shall be based on the 




It is in the interest of the Union that its 
relations with the German Reich should be 
severed :;~nd that the Union should refuse to 
adopt an attitude of neutrality in this conflict. 
'rhe Union should carry out the obligations to 
which it has agreed, and continue its co-operation 
with its friends and associates in the British 
eOIDITlonwealth of Nations. 
The Union should take all necessary measures 
for the defence of its territory and South 
African interests, and the government should not 
send forces overseas as in the last war. 
4. This House is profoundly convinced that the 
freedom and independence of the Union are at stake 
in this conflict and that it is therefore in its 
true interest to oppose the use of force as an 
instrument of national policy."40 
The next speaker in the debate was the Minister of 
Agriculture and J:I'orestry, volonel (Jollins. It was interesting 
that while Hertzog had maintained that he had been kept in the 
dark about Smuts's and his supporters' views regarding the war 
issue, this very same accusation w~s now levelled at the Prime 
Minister. Colonel (Jollins stated that had he known what 
Hertzog's policy was to be, he would have given the Prime 
Minister his views long ago. "For my colleagues and his it was 
a great surprise to hear that that (i.e. neutrality) is his 
policy. ,,41 While it was "true that HertZog had maintained a 
consistent silence since his March declaration that Parliament 
would decide when the time came, there must nevertheless have 
been many people with a shrewd suspicion that he would opt for 
neutrality. After all. his intimates in the Cabinet had long 
been making public speeches to that effect, and he had not 
disillusioned them. On the other hand, the Smutsite wing of 
the government had been saying for months past that the 
government would enter a war, and Hertzog had not offered any 
clarification on that score ei-ther. The injured astonishment 
of both sides and the mutual cry of "why didn't you tell us?" 
seems to be a little exaggerated. 
Apart from Smuts '8 Speech, the next two speeches were to 
prove the most crucial in the debate. N~r. Heaton Nicholls, 
40. Hansard, 4 September, 19'39, Vol. i....J...XVI, pp. 30 - 31. 











M.P. for Zululand was regarded as one of the most eloquent 
speakers in Parliament. An honest and intelligent man, he was 
generally esteemed in the House. The speech which he now rose 
to deliver however was to be a cause of regret to him in later 
years. The essence of his argument was that South Africa, by 
virtue of her constitutional position, was automatically at war 
if England was at war, and that therefore all argument about 
participation or neutrality was irrelevant. 
"We are at war in the eyes of every British subject, and 
if we were not at war, we cannot be British subjects. 
Is it not fundamental to the whole of the constitutional 
position of this country that we, as British subjects 
owe an allegiance to the common Crown? •••••••••••• 
The Prime Minister, by his motion, is actually 
proposing secession from our common allegiance."42 
From a psychological pOint of view this argument was disastrous, 
particularly coming from an English-speaking person. The hard 
core of either side would not be affected by anything, but to 
those conscientious but undecided members with whom independence 
and the right to decide was a point of honour, this bald 
statement must have been abhorrent. It carried with it hated 
connotations of servitude to Britain, the very thing which Smuts 
in his speech had sought to avoid. The words "constitutioh" 
and "constitutional" appear twenty~two times in Mr. Nicholl's 
speech, without there being any direct reference to South Africa's 
interests at all. While General Smuts had sought to emphasize 
the practical reasons for South Africa's participation in war, 
Mr. Nicholls spoke in emotional terms of "loyalty" and 
"allegiance" - not calculated to endear his argument to the 
average Afrikaner. There was also a certain belligerence in the 
speech of this normally restrained man: "This Parliament and 
this Prime Minister must realize that the British subjects of 
this country are not going to take secession lying down.,,43 
All in all, this speech was definitely in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. Apart from its psychological and diplomatic defects, 
Mr. Nicholl's argument was erroneous. The Union, by virtue of 
the Statute of Westmins~er, did have the right to decide on her 
course in this crisis. However, it must be admitted that at that 
time in 1939,constitutional wrangles about South Africa's status 
within the Commonwealth were still very common. 
with his impressive intellect, considered 
Even Hofmeyr 
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that the Union was legally bound to stand by Britain. 
AS Ivlr. Nicholls concluded his speect~, there must have 
been consternation in the hearts of General 0muts and his 
supporters. The cause was not yet lost. Wir. B.K. Long, who 
rose to speak in answer, has given a vivid account of his 
feelings at this point in the debate. 44 The House was due to 
adjourn for lunch in ten minutes, and Mr. Long realized that 
something must be done immediately, bel'ore the members could file' 
out to brood over Mr. Nicholls speech, the digestion of which was 
bound to affect "the decision considerably. 'l'here was a pause. 
Looking around him Mr. Long saw that no-one was rising to speak, 
so he jumped to his feet, Looking back on it, Mr. Long was to 
say, "I never dreamt that I should be the fifth speaker in a 
debate of such historic importance. My sole thought at that 
mo::nent was that I must reply to Nicholls as an English-speaking 
South African.,,45 After stating that he did not agree with the 
accusations of deceit levelled at the Prime ruinister, Mr. Long 
stated simply bu"t forcefully, that although 00uth Africa had the 
right to declare neutrality if she chose, he was convinced that 
the country's interests demanded particlpation in the war. He 
then gave an indictment of Germany's disregard of the rights and 
liberties of human beings. At 12.45 p.m., business was 
suspended for the lunch break. Though brief, Long's words had 
) 
achieved the desired effect and counterbalanc.ed Iv,r. Nicholls s 
speech. 
Bertha 0010mon and Heaton TJicholls were both staying at 
the Mount Nelson Hotel, and they walked up the Garden's avenue 
together to go 9.nd have lunch. rilrs. Solomon felt herself to be 
in an extremely awkward position. Well aware tha'c l\Jicholls' 
speech had nearly lost the case for the anti-neutrality group, 
she was at a loss as to what to say. 1':1cholls himself filled 
in the gap. "I think that speech has cost me a seat in the 
Uabinet. It's 'the second time in my life I've ;f).ade the wroag 
"46 speech a1..l 1::1. crucial moment. :le was right. :ie was not 
included in Smuts's Cabinet, although he did later go t,o London 
as South 11.frica's High Commissioner there. 
'1'he afternoon sitting commenced at 2.20 p.m., and Ilir. 
Long continued his speech. 
"If we deCide, whatever our decision way be in 
regard to the international situation, it will 
44. Vide B.K. Long, In vmuts' Camp, Chapter 5. 
45. B.IC. Long, In Smuts' Camp, p. 45. 
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be our own decision, and if our decision is to 
join with Great Britain in this war, not necessarily 
to be active in it, or to be passive in it, it would 
be our own decision, and we shall not be dragged in 
at the heels of Great :Britain."47 
This was Long's personal view :3.nd it was also the only kind of 
appeal which would meet with approval in that heteroge:;'leous 
House. 
;rhese then, were the most important parts of Long's 
speech. Another feature which added to its merit was t?le 
gracious treat:aent accorded to the Prime t,';inister. An 
unarmed British passenger liner, the "Athenia", had just oeen 
sunk by a GerGJ.an U-boat, and r:ir. Long made effecti''ie use of this 
contemporary event to substantiate his argument that liermany 
was not to be trusted. 
!Jr. Nialan' s contripution to the debate Wa.S interesting, 
for it managed to include almost the whole spectrum of his 
political beliefs. At the outset he pledged his party's 
support to Hertzog's neutrality resolution. After expressing 
an opinion that he had never doubted the Prime Minister's 
attitude towards the present issue, he proceeded to explain that 
11e had always known that Smuts and Hertzog would fallout, since 
the divergence between their views had not narrowed over the 
years. Thus, while speaking on neutrality, he was also pointing 
out that his objections to Fusion had been proved valid. He 
drew parallels between the situation in 1914 and the present 
situation, emphasizing that the constitutional position had 
changed considerably. He dwelt on the futility of war, saying 
that although the First World War had ostensibly been fought 
for high ideals, no-ching had oeen solved by it, and that this 
second war would not solve anything either. He also mentioned 
the Treaty of Versailles as the source of the trouble, but gave 
more attention to developing the argwnent that Germany was simply 
trying to unite all German elements and bring them together in 
one nation. Afrikaners cherished lihis ideal and Englishmen 
had attained it, so what '-'laS so oojectionable in liermany' s 
pursuit of this same object? The cause of "the present war, :Dr. 
f'~alan maintained, was the failure of the :Laae;ue of "\fations to 
deal adequately with Germany's grievances. He went so far as to 
say that had liermany won the last war, England, if it had been 
"worth its sal ttl, would also have produced a Hitler. 48 Eal;:ing 
a plausible disavowal oi' any racial -;:oti ves, Dr. r.·alai1 stated 
47. Hansard, 4 September, 1939, Vol. XXXVI, p. 38. 











that his only concern was the interests of South Africa. 
Mr. Marwick of the Dominion Party was more extreme in 
his advocacy of participation than General Smuts had been. H. 
based his argument on various clauses of an Empire Defence 
programme agreed to in 1926, at the time of the Balfour , 
Declaretion, saying that both Hertzog and Smuts had been bound by 
it then, and were no less bound by it now. This argument of 
course, was robbed of its effectiveness by the existence of the 
Westminster Statute, a later development which naturally 
superseded all that had gone before. Mr. Marwick also made his 
speech the occasion of a bitter attack on various ministers of 
the government, chiefly Mr. Oswald Pirow. It was alleged that 
the Minister of Defence had said on the 18 October, 1937, at 
Klerksdorp: 
"If you are ever called upon for active service or 
told to take up your rifles because we have a contract 
with England to go into war, I tell you now as Minister 
of Defence, that I give you permission to rebel and 
reruse to go into war. I tell you I shall be the 
firs1i to rebel in those circumstances.·t 49 
Pirow, who sometimes was carried away by his own eloquence, may 
possibly have said this, out it was not the time to raise such 
personal issues. In any case, Pirow, on more occasions than 
one, had stated that every soldier should do his duty in the 
event of war. Mr. Marwick felt that Smuts's resolution had 
been inadequate and "colourless lt • "I confess that I am 
profoundly disappointed with the terms of the amendment which he 
has moved in this House. I would only vote for that amendment 
as an alternative which was the only one open to me to rid the 
country of the present Prime Minister.,,50 Marwick therefore 
proposed a further amendment, made interesting because he used 
Louis Botha's words, spoken so long ago in 1914 in acceptance of 
south Africa's role in the war. This amendment was couched in 
:t'ar more effusive terms than smuts t s had been, expressive of 
loyalty to the King and the Empire, rather than concern for the 
interests of South Africa. This amendment was seconded by Mr. 
vhristopher, the member for East London North. 
Mr. Madeley, Labour M.P., recorded his support for 
General Smuts t s amendment, stating that this was no time :t"or 
constitutional squabbles. "I want a clear-cut issue today, for 
or against neutrality," he said. 51 He pOinted out that if, as 
49. ~,p. 57. 
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the Prime Minister suggested, South Africa maintained her 
present re1ations with Germany unchanged, this wou1d mean a 
continuance of trade with Germany, nand in trading with Germany 
we are supp1ying them with the essentiis for keeping on war and 
in consequence in that direction and in that degree we are 
helping Germany against Eritain by our neutrality.n52 He went 
on to state what in his view were very cogent reasons why any 
help to Germany direct or indirect, would be detrimental to the 
interests of South Africa. Revea1ing a f1air for a colourful 
turn of phrase, Mr. Madeley suggested that if South Africa 
remained neutra1 and Ue:r.ma.ny should attack her, the country 
wou1d be reauced to a "nation of p01i tica1 and military 
mendiQanta~53 If South Africa, with her non-existent navy was 
prepared to acc~t the protection of :Britain, .. fe11; that this 
in turn exacted support for ~ritain from South Africa. Ending 
wi th a plea for the preservation of democracy, he reiterated his I 
support for Smuts's amendment. 
Intensely interesting, in this crucial debate, was the 
way in which the speeches refleoted the personalities and 
oharacters of their deliverers - Smuts with his incisive 
inte11ectual qua1ities and shrewd psychological insight; Marwick 
with his fervent 10yalty to the British connection; Malan with 
his subtlety of mind and consciousness of exclusively Afrikaner 
interests; Madeley with his flair for the dramatic. Thus far 
only Genera~ Hertzog and Mr. Heaton Nich01ls had been seduced by 
the exigencies of the situation into dec1arations which can not 
be described as entirely faithrul to their convictions and 
characters. Mr. Hofmeyr's speech, which f0110wed Mr. Madeley's, 
was also indicative of his moral and intellectua1 arfinities, 
couched in the main in philosophical terms. "To me," he said, 
war is a hateful thing, I loathe it with every fibre of my 
being. It cuts down to the very roots of religiOUS and 
philosophioal oonceptions which for me are very essentia1. n54 
Nevertheless, Mr. Hofmeyr stated tha~ it was his conviction that 
South Africa should enter the war for the preservation of 
democratic ideals as well as for the sa~ety of South Africa. 
Rec~gnizing the fact that South Africa's population was not a 
homogeneous one, he yet felt that there should be no hesitation 
before dangers of possib1e unrest. The sole criterion in 
deciding the issue should be the rightness of the course taken. 
52. Hansard, 4th September, 1939, Vol. XXXVI, p. 65. 
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Mr. Hofmeyr did go into the practical considerations mitigating 
against neutrality, bu~ the larger part of his address was 
concerned with the more universal aspects of the issue. It was 
interesting that although he also felt that South africa was 
legally bound to enter the war on Britain's side, his statement 
to this 'ffect did not produce the antagonism which Mr. Heaton 
Nicholls' had done. Perhaps this was due in part to the fact 
that he dealt with the constitutional aspect only in passing, 
and that, coming from an Afrikaans-speaking member, this 
argument did not carry racial connotations and could therefore 
be construed simply as his "Individual idiosyncracy" as Mr. E.K. 
Long has suggested. 55 
A st(j.ge had been reached in the debate where almost all 
the important points had been covered, and the rest of the 
speeches merely served to Hupport one or other of the two 
contentions. 
at 8.05 p.m. 
Business had been suspended at 6 p.m. and resumed 
Throughout, the debate had been characterized, 
exc~pt in a few instances, by ~ singular restraint and dignity, 
Amongst the speeches, the Swan Song of Fusion had been 
heard. Several of the speakers had lamentea its passing, and 
expressed sincere regret that the parting of the ways had come. 
But at approximately 9 p.m., the hour for decision had arrivea, 
and there was no time for other considerations. The Speaker 
put Hertzog's neutr(j.li~y motion before the House. There was 
~ con<.:erted rOar of HAyes! n and !i"oes! II t:l.nd the bell~ for a 
division rang. 56 'to Hertzog's side ct:l.lllelihe J:,'Lalanite Opposition, 
while to Smuts' side went the"Dominionites, IJhe Laoour members, 
the three native represent~tives, ~d such United Party men as 
Colin Steyn, Louw Steytler and Gert Heyns, among others. 57 
The figures were announced. Smuts' amendment had been carried 
by 80 votes to 67. 58 South Africa had opted for war by a 
majority of thirteen votes. As realization dawned upon him, 
Hertzog, visibly shaken, turned to Oswald Pirow in sudden anger. 
It seems that he had been led by Mr. Pirow to expect far more 
support than he actually received. Something had indeed gone 
very wrong with Pirow's calculations.59 Out of a total of 153 
55. B.K. Long, In Smuts's Camp, p. 45. 
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members, 147 had actually voted, and Smuts' majority was composed 
of 66 United Party members, seven members of the Dominion Party, 
three Native representatives and four Labour Party members. 
Thirty-eight of Hertzog's followers in the United Party had 
stayed with h~, plus the Twenty-nine Malanites. Twenty-four 
Afrikaners had voted for Smuts's amendment. 61 
It was over. The hubbub died down, the public galleries 
emptied. General Hertzog walked out, leaning slightly on Mr. 
Havenga's arm. He seemed astounded and crushed. 62 
While this drama was being enacted within, large crowds 
had gathered outside the House of Assembly, during the course of 
the day_ The gallery was packed to capacity, and no further 
admissions were possible, but yet the crowd outside waited, 
gathering in numbers as the evening progressed. As news of the 
decision spread, there was an outburst of cheering. Cries of 
"We want Smutsl1 were intermingled with calls for Hertzog. As 
Ministers and members emerged, the crowds pressed closer. As 
General Hertzog was escorted to his car by policemen,l a mingled 
roar of boos and cheers went up. Mr. Pirow was lifted to the 
shoulders of an enthusiastic mob of supporters and taken to his 
car, while bystanders booed. Apparently the cheers for Smuts 
were the most protracted and widespread, but he did not emerge, 
having left quietly by a private exit. The crowds, thwarted 
of this opportunity to applaud him, thinned out and eventually 
dispersed. 63 It had been a momentous day. 
There have been speculations in the years since the war 
that had the vote gone the other way, South Africa would 
eventually have been forced to enter the war anyway, because of 
the impossibility of maintaining the qualified neutrality which 
Hert~og advocated. Then with an angry Germany on the doorstep, 
it is imagined that all dissident elements, Malan and Hertzog 
included, would have leapt into the fray in common with the rest 
of South Africa. i.e. the same result would have been attained, 
but with a United South Africa behind it. Possibly there is 
something in thiS, but at the time South Africa could not afford 
to sit and wait for such an eventuality. 
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On September 5 the House of Assembly met at 10.30 a.m. 
After the customary prayers the Sp,uer announced that the 
Senate Bill had been passed by the Senate, and would be sent to 
the Governor-General for his signature. Then Hertzog rose and 
moved the suspension of business. After he had done so, he 
went across and whispered to Malan. What he said is unknown, 
but the Nationalists immediately crowded around him, shaking 
hands and clapping him on the .:ahoulder. It was an unusual 
scene. 64 
An amusing incident occurred at this same sitting. 
When Hertzog had completed his statement advocating neutrality 
the previous day, express messages were sent off to London 
conveying this news. ~hen, for some reason, telegraphic and 
radio communication with Britain broke down, and so, for the 
next twelve hours, no message could be got through to say that 
the Union had decided on participation. In the meantime news 
had flashed around Europe that South Africa w~s neutral. The 
next -.ening Smuts, while sitting in the House, received a 
telegram from a Union official in Europe saying "Hail, great 
General, we knww we could rely on your steadfastness". This 
same official (probably Mr. Charles te Water, High Commissioner, 
in London) had beenknown for his pro-neutrality attitude. 
Smuts handed the telegram to one of his colleagues, commenting 
"That was very nice of the old boy." However it was soon 
realized that the telegram had been sent when Europe was still 
under the impression that South Afric~ was to remain neutral, 
so that the telegram could not have been meant for Smuts at all! 
He accordingly sent ~he telegram across to General Hertzog, 
writing on iv, "1 think this must oe intended for you."65 
The House a.ssembled that afternoon at 2.45 'p.m., and the 
public galleries were crowded wivh people waiting to hear whether 
the Prime 1Jinister would announce his reSignation. Hertzog rose 
and said: "Mr. Speaker, 1 wish to move the adjournment of the 
House, on the understanding that the Rouse will not meet tomorrow 
at lO.30, and that after the adjournment today, a proclamation 
will be issued proroguing Parliament." The motion was passed 
and the House dispersed.66 
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It has been alleged by some that Hertzog had arranged 
in advance for Par11BDRxrt to be prorogued, so that he could 1 
declare-neutrality with Parliament in recess, and rule by martial 
law. 67 It was true that Hertzog and Pirow had drawn up a set 
of emergency regulations to keep the peace in South Africa, 
should there be opposition after a neutrality policy had been 
decided upon. 68 But then, Hertzog had confidently anticipated 
a vote in favour of neutrality. There was no question of 
applying martial law without the sanction of Parliament. 
General Hertzog had always said that when the time came, 
Parliament would decide, and there seems little evidence, despite 
the wild rumours which circulated, to disbelieve him. 
The previous evening tSeptember 4) after the debate in 
Parliament, General Hertzog had called on Sir Patrick Duncan, 
the Governor-General, and asked for a lismissal of Parliament, 
and the holding of a general election. Sir Patrick Duncan did 
not feel justified in doing this, for the reasons set down in the 
following letter, which he delivered to Hertzog on September 5: 
"I have given careful consideration to the proposal 
you made to me last eyeing that I should dissolve 
Parliament with a view to a general election. There 
is a general feeling, which I share that a general 
election at the present moment would lead to great 
bitterness and even violence. The situation must, 
however, be accepted if there is no constitutional 
alternative. 
The present Parliament w~s elected in May last 
year. The question of South Africa's participation 
in a war in which England was involved w~s at the time 
clearly before the people, and the policy of the 
uovernment, as proclaimed by you and your Ministers, 
was that the question would be decided by the chosen 
representatives of the people in Parliament. When 
war broke out the Government placed the question 
before Parliament for deciSion, but was divided on the 
recommendation that should be made to the House. Two 
opposing motions were submitted, by you and by General 
Smuts respectively, and the House decided by a 
conSiderable majority to adopt that of General Smuts. 
In the ciroumstances I cannot see on what groun~ 
I should be justified in rejecting the decision of the 
House and holding a general election if General Smuts, 
whose policy obtained the support of the House, is in 
67. Vide t7.H. Wilson, Gone Down the Years, pp. 210 - 211. 











a position to form a governaent which will have 
the support of the House. I have therefore asked 
him, if possible today, to inform me whether he can 
form such a government. If he is in a ~ition to 
do so, I would not feel justified in accepting your 
proposal to dissol~e Parliament."69 
Hertzog, although disagreeing, thereupon had no choice but to 
reSign and Duncan requested General Smuts to form a new 
government. 
The reason that Hertzog had not made a formal 
announcement of his resignation in Parliament on September 5, 
was probably the teohnical point that the Governor-General had 
deferred acceptance of his reSignation until General Smuts had 
indicated that he was able to form a new ministry.70 
Duncan's decision was constitutionally correot. Also it 
was not without precedent. A similar situation had occurred in 
Canada in 1926 when the then uovernor-General, Lord Eyng, acting 
on his own authority, had refused to dissolve ~he canadian 
Parliament when advised to do so by the Prime Minister.7l 
However, there were those who argued that the deCision was not 
constitutional, notably General Kemp, who said ~he ~overnor­
General's action was "the most unconstitutional step ever taken 
by a uovernor-General.·72 Rumours were circulated to the erfect 
that General Hertzog had threatened as a result of Duncan's 
~cision, to do all in his power to bring about the abolition of 
the office of Governor-General. These rumours achieved such 
currency that Sir Patrick Duncan instructed his Secretary to 
write a .letter to the Press, vindicating the former Prime 
Minister. It ran in part: "I am directed to inform you that 
no such statement was made to his Excellenoy by General Hertzog 
and that General Hertzog's attitude in relation to his Ezoellency 
upon this occasion, as upon all others, was scrupulously fair 
and correct.·73 
Smuts assembled his Oabinet with the utmost haste. It 
was completed by September 6, people who were elsewhere in the 
69. From a typed copy of the Governor-General's letter of 
September 5, 1939, in the collection of vunc~ Papers in the 
Jagger Library. 
70. u.A.L. Green, An Editor Looks Back, p. 207. 
71. From a note attached to a copy of The Governor-General's 
letter to General Hertzog, 5 September, 1939, Duncan Papers •. 
72. Rand Daily Mail, 9 September, 1939, p, 11. 











country having been contacted by telephone and telegraph. 
Colonel Stallard, ror instance, was just concluding a speech 
at a by-election meeting at Albert Palls near Pietermaritzburg, 
on ~eptember 5, when he was called to the telephone to receive, 
a message from General Smuts, inviting him to proceed to Cape 
~own with all possible haste. 74 
The new cabinet consisted of Smuts as Prime Minister and 
M1nis~er ot Defence; J.R. Hotmeyr as Minister of Finance; 
Colonel Collins as Minister ot Agriculture; Dr. Colin Steyn as 
Minister ot Justioe; Mr. Claude sturrook as Minis-;er ot 
Railways; Senator Co~y as Minister of Lands; Mr. Clarkson as 
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs; Harry Lawrence as Minister of 
the Interior; Mr. 8tuttatord as Minister of Commerce and 
Industries; Colonel Stallard as Minister of Mines; Mr. Madeley I 
as Minister ot Laoour and Major Piet van dar ~l as Minister 
without Porttolio.75 
Hertzog, for fifteen years Prime Minister of the Union, 
wa.s out of the govern:JRi1:t. On the afte moon of September 5,"1 
Hertzog walked into his office to find some of his statt Sitting I 
about the room in attitudes ot dejection. ""at lyk jullie dan I 
so bek-af?W he said ~Ek ~rdeer hoe jullie voel, maar as die dag 
ooit moet kom dat die staatsdiens 'n deel word van die party-
masjien sal dit baie jammer weese Ek verwag dus van julli. 
dat jullie die nuwe regering net so getrou sal dien as wat jullie 
my gedien hetw • 76 Despite the reverses in his politioal 
fortunes, General Hertzog was never to deviate from his adherence 
to the principles ot constitutional government. 
Smuts was again at the helm. !he decision ror war had 
oeen taken. Now the task whieh lay ahead was to put that 
decision into effect, and to cope with a country thoroughly 
divided, and in some instances, violent in sentiment. As yet 
no-one knew exactly what the reaction was going to be. 
74. Cape ~gus, 5 September, 1939, p. 11. 
75. Deneys neitz, No Outsp~, p. 243. 
76. Wennle du Plessis in "Jcmes ~arry Munnik Hertzog - die Mens", 












THE IMMEDIA~E REAu~ION TO PARLIAMEN~S DECISION 
TO ENTER THE WAR 
The Second World War had begun. Twenty-five years 
before, South Africa in common with the other nations had faced 
a similar situation. History seemed to ~e repeating itself. 
Once again South Africa, at :Bri tains side, was involved inf--a 
war against Germany, and once again the decision had been made in 
the face of strong opposition from a large section of the 
population. In 1914 this opposition had crystallized in the 
form of armed rebellion against the government. In 1939 it did 
not seem inconceivable that violence would erupt again. The 
passage of the years had not brought with it a softening of the 
Afrikaner antagonism towards Britain. These years had seen the ! 
growth of Afrikaner nationalism. Aftrikanerdom had become more 
organized and militant; more conscious of the principle of 
natienhood and more articulate in the expression of its ideology. 
Might not heightened cultural and political awareness result in 
a violent demonstration of independence? In fact no such 
demonstration took place. The forecasts of the prophets of 
doom were proved wrong. There was no civil war in South Africa 
in 1939. 
The fact that the domestic situation remained peaceful 
can be attributed to different factors. Experience had perhaps 
brought with it a degree of political sophistication. True, the 
terminology of politicians had undergone no change. The words 
·strydU and ·oorwinning" were still to be found in the political 
vocabulary and on the lips of ordinary citizens, but their 
connotations were symbolic rather than physical. A war did take' 
place, but it was a war of words, not of bullets. 
Credit must be given to the Opposition leaders who 
conSistently warned their tollowers to confine their protests 
against the government's decision to strictly constitutional 
channels. Such men as Kemp, Pirow, )(alan and Hertzog said in 
public and in private that although determined opposition must be 
maintained, this opposition should not assume any extra-legal 
form. Inevitably there were hotheads ready to take matters into 
their own hands, but as it happened, no.e of their plans came to 
fruition •• 
When Hertzog prorogued Parliament on September 5, he had 
not made any official announcement of his reSignation, because as 











effective until Smuts had given an affirmative answer to the 
Governor-General's request that he form a new government. 
However it was quite clear that this was a mere formality and 
that he was in fact no longer Prime Minister. Unfortunately the 
S.A.B.C. broadcast a bald statement that Hertzog had prorogued 
Parliament without resigning, the implication being that he 
intended to disregard Parliament's decision and rule by Martial 
law. Die Vaderland added to the confusion by stating definitely, 
that Hertzog had not resigned, but had invoked certain sections 
of the Defence Act. This could quite easily have led to civil 
unrest. but this was averted by a report giving the real facts 
of the case which was published in a special edition of the 
Johannesburg Star. l 
Bans van Re_burg, in his book !heir Paths Crossed Mine, 
has eiven an account of this accurrence which reveals certain 
inconsistencies. He states that the broadcast ocourred on 4 
September, not the 5, and goes on to tell of a conapiracy whioh 
he arranged with a few of his subordinates in the Defence Foroe. 
In Bl~emfontein van Rensburg called together oertain officers in 
his brigade and told them that should there be disturbances in 
the city that night, they should be prepared for action. "I 
told my officers (he said) the I required nothing fromthem 
whioh was not oompatible with military duty; that if we got any ~! 
orders from higher up we should immediatel1 carry them out to the 
best of our ability."2 He gave the: impreSSion that his only 
aim was to preserve order, but then adds: "Why be kidnapped 
for the duration if such enforced hospitality could be obviated 
wi th a little foreSight?" 3 Who would be wanting to kidnap him? 
~e current interpretation of the gaffe on the radio was that 
Hertzog, in pursuanoe of neutrality, had instituted martial law. I 
Van Reaab~yas a staunch supporter of neutrality, so his fear 
of internment was illogical, unless he was under the total 
misapprehension that it was Smuts who was instituting martial law 
in order to force South Africa into the war. Whatever his 
motivation, van Rensburg and his assooiates prooeeded to make 
elaborate arrangements, oomp1ete with code-words and illicit 
petrel supplies. ~he entire cloat-and-dagger episode was oalled 
off when van Rensburg heard that the original information had 
been erroneous. "For I had not been flirting with a putsch," 
he said. "I had been dOing what I regarded as my duties as a 
1. G.A.L. Green, An Editor Looks Baok,pp. 207 - 208. 
2. Hans van Rensburg, Their Paths Cross.dMine, p. 152. 











senior orficer, in case a situation should develop locally in 
which no orders (or chaotic and conrlicting orders) were 
available. n4 This may have been so, but it was certainly a 
muddled account. 
A plot of a different sort which also never came to 
fruition hasr>een revealed by :Brigadier E.P. Hartshorn in his 
book Avenge Tobruk. He and other senior officials of the Active 
Citizen Foree were extremely concerned lest South Africa should 
declare herself neutral. Hartshorn and two other orficers whom 
he does not mention by name evolved a plan, the details of which 
were as follows: If Parliament opted for neutrality, the three 
men would see to it that the Active Citizen Force uniw'based on 
the Johannesburg Drill Hall would be assembled at a given hour in 
the Union Grounds, and upon receipt of certain codewords would 
depart in army vehicles for Natal, where they would gather -
9,000 in all - upon the historic site of the :Battle or Majuba. 
According to Hartshorn this was not intended as an armed uprisin6 
but as a mass demonstration. In any case, since all ammunition 
had been locked away in the Grand Depot in Pretoria, the men were 
only equipped with old world war one ammunition, and very little ! 
or it at that, thus precluding any er.ective military action. 
This flamboyant and rather theatrical plan was seen by Hartshorn 
as a moral protest, "a spectacular demonstration on the part or tlll 
the country's fighting men. n5 Parliamentsts decision on the 
night or December 4 rendered the whole plan unneces8ary. An 
indication or the attention given to the smallest details of the 
plot is the ract that as soon as the news'was heard, Hartshorn 
and the two other orficers rushed into an orfiee in the Drill 
Hall, Johannesburg, and hasi;ily burnt incriminating papers in an 
empty forty-four gallon drum placed for that purpose on the 
verandah outside the orfice. 
While these minor dramas were being anscted in the army, 
similar plans had been made amongst certain sectors in the .ir 
Force. Those pilots who were determined that South Africa 
should enter the war, even if Parliament decided otherwise, had 
crammed their aircraft with all available ammunition, and on the 
4 September were ready to fly to Rhodesia where a few British 
fighters were standing by to escort them into the country. That 
this was not simply a dashing chivalrous errand can be seen by a 
meaningful remark which a South African Squadron Leadir made to 
4. Van Rensburg, ~heir Paths Crossed Mine, p. 153. 












Brigadier Hartshorn a few months later when describing the 
epis~de: "We had every Nationalist supporter in the Air Force 
carefully marked. n6 
It should be mentioned that Hartshorn's Book has been 
severely criticized, and it is unfortuna~e that there is no w~ 
of testing the veracity of the above-mentioned accounts, beoause 
any shred of material evidence would long since have been 
destroyed (always supposing that such evidence had existed in the, 
first place), leaving only the memories of the people concerned. 
For that Matter there m&7 have been other plots of which nothing 
at all is known because their creators have decided not to 
divulge them. Inevitably there was a rash of wild rumours, for 
the most part baseless. In the second week of September reports· 
of a p~ot by Pretoria University students to sack Government 
House gained such currency that Police instituted inquiries, only 
to discover that the reports had been quite untoundad.7 There 
were also rumours that "disaifected elements" (probably meaning 
the Ossewa-Brandwag) had planned to advance on Pretoria and 
Johannesburg and sabotage industrial key-points. These rumours 
were not convincingly substantiated. 8 Of immediata concern is 
the fact though the potential for a civil conflict existed, no 
such conflict materialized. 
In view of the bitternesa with which the entire 
neutrality issue was fraught, it is remarkable that the country 
accepted the situation with relative ca1m. The only violent 
incidents worthy of note in early September 1939 were sporadic 
outburs~s of an~i-Ger.man feeling. On the night of September 
3 there was a public meeting of Oommunists in the Trades Hall in 
Johann~sburg, where the subject under discussion was "the 
European situation and our attitude in South Africa." After 
meeting someone suggested that they should all march to the 
the 
German club and Sing "Jiule .Britannia", whereupon an enormous 
crowd marched up to the German Club on the corner of Loveday and 
Plein streets. The police, who had been antiCipating such an 
occurence, hastily gathered reinforcements for the existing cordon 
around the ClUb, and a senior official ordered the crowd to 
disperse. Perpahs his choice of words was unfortunate, ror 
suddenly pandemonium broke loose. The crowd surged forward and 
there was a hail of bottles, stones and similar objects.9 In 
6. Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, pp. 17 - 18. 
7. Forum, 16 September 1939, Vol.II, No. 25, p. 3. 
8. G.A.L. Green, An Editor Looks Back, p. 217. 













the midst of the melee, a certain James Holmes, a bricklayer 
by pro!~ssion,was to be observed on an adjoining vacant lot, 
plying the combatants with the tools of his ~rade. "Help 
yourselves, boys!" he shouted, as he tossed bricks into the 
street. 10 Eventually the crowd was subdued with the ~id of tear 
gas. 
The following evening, Johannesburg was once again the 
scene of public disturbances when a crowd of 2,000 gathered in 
Loveday Street, setting alight two lorries belonging to a German 
firm, smashing the windows of a German shipping line office and a 
shop J and attempting to attack the German Club again. This time 
smoke-bombs as well as tear gas were used. ll On September 5 in 
Do 0 rnfonte in , Johannesburg, ~he police once more had to bear the 
brunt of anti-German fe~ing when a crowd of 200, thwarted in 
their attempts to set fire to the premises of German radio 
engineers, turned on the police, pelting them with stones and 
other objects.12 A few days later a bomb exploded outside the 
Hotel Victoria in the centre of Johannesburg, killing one passer-
by and seriously injuring two others. The exact motivation for 
this act was not disoovered, Dut it was thought to have been an l 
a~tempt to incite animosity between pro- ~d anti-wGr factions~3 
On September 6 the Administrator of the Transvaal, General J.J. 
Pien&ar, broadcast an appeal to the public to refrain from lawless! 
acts. On the same day the South African Trades and Labour 
Council passed a resolution deploring riots, and asking workers 
to remsin calm. 14 All over the oountry public offioials were 
making similar appeals, and on the whole these seem to have been 
efficacious, for after this instances of unrest wer. isolated. 
Other evidences of anti-German feeling were seen in the 
strikes which occurred in various parts of the country. ~or 
instanoe, at the South African Airways headqUarters in Germiston, 
100 men, mostly mechanics and ground engineers, went on strike, 
refUSing to work with German employees or to take ~rders Trom 
two (ierman foreman. 15 In Cape Town the Baker's Union threaliened 
10. Cape ~rgus, 12 September, 1939, p. 11. 
1.1. Hand Dai1l Mail, 5 September, 1939, p. 10. 
12. Rand Dai1l Mail, 6 September, 1939, p. 10. 
13. Cape ArguS, 15 September, 1939, p. 13. 
14. Rand Daily Mail, 6 September, 1939, p. 11. 











to strike if its members were forced to carry on working side 
by side with Germans. 16 
It was a very uncomfortable time for German residents. 
from September 2 onwards, there was an exodus of Germans from 
the country, the majority of whom appeared to be making for 
Portuguese East Africa. An Aliens Registration Act was gazetted 
on September 6, requiring all aliens (approximately 35,000 in 
number) to register at police stations throughout the country. 
'he response on the whole was rapid, and the entire procedure 
went off smoothly. 'he South African Central Committee of 
German Refugees made haste to give the government assurances of 
loyalty, and a start was made with the compilation of a register 
of Germans willing to do military service on the same terms as 
South African citizens.17 
General Smuts in the meantime was taking steps to ensure 
that no subversive activity took place. On September 5 a 
proclamation was issued under the provisions of the Arms and 
Ammunition Act, whereby it was forbidden for any person to supply 
any other person with arms or ammunition without the express 
I 
permission of the Minister of Defence or the Minister of Justice. J , 
Transportation of arms and ammunition from one place to another 
was also forbidden. 18 This proclamation was very strictly 
enforce! by the police. Another measure which served to prevent! 
potential trouple was Smuts's requisitioning of all rifles held 
by private individuals. ~he ostensible reason for this step was 
South Africa'S admittedly dire need for arms of any description, 
but it has been widely held in the years since the war that it 
was a shrewd attempt by Smuts to prevent any repetition of the 
1914 rebellion. Many of the rifles garnered in this manner 
were rather antiquated, which lends weight to the belief that theJ 
were not requisitioned primarily for their value to the country's 
defences. It is interesting to note that General Kemp flatly 
refused to hand over his own rifle, apparently feeling that this 
was the last straw. He was not prosecuted (which was probably 
another evidence of Smuts's tact) although others who balked 
at parting with their guns, were. 19 In South West Africa 
several caches of buried weapons came to l~ght after this, 
probably in response to the fear that similar requisitioning 
would be extended to the territory. This was in fact done, but 
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It was interesting that although South Africa had to all 
intents and purposes been at war with Germany since the night of 
September 4, Official notification of this was not given until thf 
afternoon of September 6, when General Smuts and Sir Patrick 
Duncan signed a proclamation declaring the Union to be at war 
with Germany.2l At the same time the Union Minister in Holland, 
Dr. H.D. van Broekhuizen, was instructed to telegraph Dr. S.F.N. 
Gie, the Minister in Germany, informing him that South Africa 
was at war with Germany, and that he should notify the Germ&Il 
Government of the situation. ~. German Ambassadorial and 
Consulat officials were given their papers and requested to 
leave~ the Dutch Legation being henceforward entrusted with 
ordinary German affairs. 22 
.eanwhile, in South West Africa the question on the lips 
of people throughout the terri tory was tI Are we really at war 
with Germany?" No proclamation had been issued in the 
territory to that erfect and South Arrican residents-grew 
1 
alarmed as Nazis continued to display Swastika pennants on their 
oars~d to greet one another in the streets with enthusiastic 
cries of "Heil H1tler!ft23 On September 8, members of the United i 
I 
Party in Windhoek entered their hall to find themselves ' 
confronting a large Swastika on the wall, together with 
photographs of Hitler and H1ndenburg.24 After a f •• days 
anxiety it was learnt that South West Africa was automatically 
at war by virtue of the Union's severance of relations with 
Germany, and there was a perceptible lessening or overt Nazi 
activit7.':~ 
Smuts's government, amid the feverish activities of these 
days, was contriving in a methodical fashion to err.ct measures 
for the regulation of the country in war-time. On September 9, 
Emergency Finance Regulations were promulgated, restricting the 
purchaae, sale, export or loan of foregn currency and gold. All 
available gold was to be sold to the Treasury within thirty days 
\ 
of the proclamation, Bb a price to be fixed by the Treasury. 
The penalty for contravention of these regulations was severe, 
involving the payment of a £500 fine or imprisonment for two 
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financial panic in the Union, although there had been a run on 
the banks in South West Africa immediately after the 
Parliamentary Debate on September 4. 26 Nevertheless, it was 
generally agreed that the regulations were necessary and would 
have .. detrimental ef~ect 0_ nor.mal trade once the situation had' 
been stabilized. 
On September 14, a series of National Emergency 
Regulations was declared to be in force. These covered a wide 
rield and although they were tactfully designated "Emergency 
Regul~ions" they amounted really to mar~ial law. Under the 
provisions of the proclamation the following activities were 
prohiDited: hoarding; profiteering; gatherings or processions 
of a nature other than ecclesiastical, sporting, financial or 
for the purpose of entertainment. The sending of fGod or aid 
to enemy countries was also prohibited. A National Supplies 
Control Eoard was set up with powers to fix maximum prices; 
prohibit the sale, purchase or eXChange o~ goods if deemed 
necessary, ~nd to extract information concerning supp1ies from 
anyone. The Government w~s also empowered 10 requisition goodS 
or land needed for pUDlic purposes and to order the manuracture 
ot necessary goods from any individual or industry. Wide 
powers of search, arrest and detention were given to officials 
specirically aut~lzed for tha~ purpose and ordinary courts 
were invested with emergency powers to try orfenders and to 
impose the maximum p nalties prescribed for contr~vention of any 
of these regulations. The Minister of Defence could prohibit 
any person whatsoever from leaving the Union unless that person 
had been authorized to do so. Other minor proviSions, were the 
restriction or the sale of liquor, and the safequarding of 
employees who volunteered for military service.~7 
That these Regulations were necessary, was demonstrable 
even in this early stage of the war. As soon as the Union's 
decision was known, there had been)a rush on shops to obtain 
foodstuffs and other essential commodities. This tendency was 
particularly marked in the Cape Peninsula, where shops were 
en~irely denuded of stocks almost overnight. Mr. Walter Fowkes, 
the President of the Cape ~own Chamber of Commerce, issued an 
appeal for a cessation of hoarding, stating that supplies of 
essential commodities in the country were quite adequate.28 The 
~6. Cape ArguS, 4 September, 1939, p. 9. 
27. Union Gazette Extx--ordinaq, No. 2679, 14 September, 1939. 
28. Cape ArguS, 5 September, 1939, p. 5. 











newspapers took up the campaign, but despite repeated assurances 
that there would be no short~es, hoarding continued until the 
Emergency Regulations came into effect. 
Smuts took care to keep the public informed on the 
reasons behind ~he measureS he took, to avoid a possible harmful 
misreprebenta~ion of the government's actions. On September 7 
he had issued a statement explaining and giving details o~ his 
resolution in Parliament. The day af~er the promulgation of 
the National ~ergency Regulations, he issued an official 
memorandum which explained the necessity for extraordinary 
measures to safeguard the security of the state. 29 
, , , 
Internment of enemy aliens commenced on 14 September, 
when theee well-known Germans were taken in custojy in Pretoria, 
shortly to be followed by others. 30 The Baviaanspoort 
inebriates'refor.mat.~ on the outskirts of Pretoria had been 
converted into an internment camp, and later on additional camps I 
were established at Koffiefontein and Leeuwkop. The largest 
mass detentions during September were those of the entire German 
staff o~ seventy men employed at I cor,3l and fifty men from the 
German ship "Hagen" which had been seized by government agents ~ 
in Durban harbour on September 9. 32 In South West Africa, prior 
to September 14, there had been considerable agitation on the 
part o~ Union residents n favour of spee~ application of martiaJI 
law. There was a few days delay before the provisions of the 
Emergency Regulations were enforced, but by September 20 the 
first Germans were being interned in a disused Wireless station 
some distance outside of Windhoek. In South West Africa even 
more than in the Union, it was necessary to exercise considerable 
discretion in sorting out Nazis from non-Na~is. In view of the 
large number of Germans resident in the territory and the 
impossibility of maintaining constant surveillance over them, it 
was decided to exact from all Germans a declaration of good 
behaviour. Liberty of movement was restricted in that Germans 
were forbidden to pass from one district to another without a 
permit. 33 By September 26 fifty Germans had been interned at 
Windhoek. Defiant Nazi demonstrations which had hitherto been 
so noticeable in South West Africa, showed a marked decrease 
with the advent of i~ternment. The newspapers noted with 
amusement that formerly ardent Nazis were to be observed 
29. Vide Cape lrgus, 7 September, 1939, p. 9 and 15 September, 
1939, p. 14. 
30. Rand Daily Mail, 15 September, 1939, p. 10. 
31. Cape Argus, 19 September, 1939, p. 9. 
32. Cape Argus, 9 September, 1939, p. 11. 











diligently painting Gut Swastikas on windmills and outbuildings, 
and removing Swastika flags from flagstaffs. One enthusiast 
had even had a Swastika moulded into the facade of his house. 
This piece of ornamentation was rapidly chipped off and plastered: 
over! 34 
In the eyes of Afrikaners, internment was an indignity 
and a source of bitterness, for it was not only Germans who were 
thus confined. The Emergency Regulations had stated that 
"dangerous persons" were to be detained if necessary, and this 
included subversive elements amongst the South African population 
Internment was a thorny problem because the memories of the 
British concentration camps of the Anglo-Boer War lingered on. 
Hans van Rensburg in his book Their Paths Crossed Mine, has told 
of the intense resentment aroused by the internment of Afrikaners~ 
maintaining that deliberate attempts were made by the government ' 
to humiliate South African internees by placing them in buildings I 
which bad formerly housed african indentured labourers and 
miscreants. 
"The place of internment for Daniel du Toit and 
others was the saal reformatory at Leeuwkop near 
Johannesburg. It had, immediately prior to the entry 
of the internees, been used for natives. Their rags 
and tatters were still lying about when our men were 
marched In.l')rbaps in the confusion and stress of 
wartime, this was inevitable, but we believed it to be 
deliberate. "35 
It hardly seems likely that the government, absorbed by 
the exigencies of the war situation, would have descended to such 
pettiness, nevertheless the Opposition continued to criticize 
the government on these grounds. It is interesting to note that 
the internment question loomed so large in the minds of militant 
Afrikaners: that van Re~.burg cites it as a definite cause of the 
acceleration in the growth of the Ossewa-Brandwag. This 
organization came in for increasing attention atter 1940, and 
1942 saw a continual stream of prominent O.B. officials into 
the internment camps.36 
While the government was criticized by the 0ppo$ition 
for unnecessary severity in regard to internment, some members ,1 
of the English-speaking section maintained that there was not ! 
sufficient vigilance concerning subversive activities. This was 
34. Cape Arsus, 26 September, 1939, p. 10. 
35. van Rensburg, Their Paths Crossed Mine, p. 150. 











disproved as time passed and it became apparent that the 
government had the situation well in hand. It should be 
mentioned that although individuals could be detained without 
a hearing or warrant, they were able to appeal to the Chief of 
Police and to the Minister of the Interior, and if they could 
provide proof of loyalty, were thereupon released. A 
considerable number did secure their release in this manner. 37 
The effect of South Africa's entry into the war on the 
economic life of the country was immediately apparent. There 
was a rise in the cost of living, as prioes went up. This fact 
did not go unnoticed by the government, as can De seen in the 
economic prOvisions of the Emergency Regulations. The Treasury 
inaugurated a schame ~o bring the Union's Public Service into 
line with war oonditions. On September 14 the Secret~ for 
Finance, Dr. J .E. Holloway announced that all government '" 
activities other than military would be reduced as far as 
possible, and the various deparb.ments were instructed to under-
take no new schemes without express permission rrom the Treasury. 
It was also arranged that civil servants who were called up for 8 
mili tary servioe would oontinue to receive their normal. salarie~. ; 
Various organizations made a point of keeping the government's 
attention riveted on the economic situation. The Public 
Servants Association, for instance, decided in October to make 
frequent representations to the government concerning the rising 
cost of living, suggesting such measures as rent rebates and 
subsidies for housing schemes. 39 The National Executive 
Committee of the South African Trades and Labour Council held 
several discussions with General Smuts and the Minister of 
LabOur, Mr. Madeley, during September and October. The 'frades 
and Labour Council was concerned for the safeguarding of 
industrial agreements, wage determination and working conditions. 
Another request was for the adequate representation of Trade 
Unions on all committees created under the ~ergency Regulations. 
General Smuts received these suggestions sympathetically and the 
Council expressed itself very satisfied with these talks. 40 
37. M. Kentridge, I Recall, p. 293 
38. Rand Daily Mail, 15 September, 1939, p. 11. 
39. Vide Cape .argus,3 October, 1939, p. ,14. 











The various Chambers ot Commerce in the major cities 
performed a v~luable service in issuing appeals for calm, 
together with prac~1cal suggestions for the avoidance of economic 
I 
disruption. There was an agricultural boom c~usedDY the demand' 
ror produce occasioned by the increased shipping trarric to the 
country's po~s. The Cape Province particularly benefitted 
from this. However this favourable agricultural development was 
counterblanced by a lass of exports, especially in ~he case of 
fruit, since this w~s conSidered a luxury rather than a 
necessity by countries aOL"oad. Oonsiderable difficulty was 
experienced in persuading ships to take on rruit as ~ cargo. 
After negotiations oetween the Department ot agriculture and the 
Deciduous Exchange, it was decided that part of the crop would 
go to the South African consumer &nd part would be canned with 
the aid of a £400,000 government SUbsidy.41 A"~ South 
AfL-ica.n 1f campaign was initiated, and retail grocers reported a 
marked increase in 8ales. 42 There w~s no doubt that the 
government was doing all in its power to preserve eoonomic 
stability. Besides the prohibition of profiteering and hoarding: 
provision was made for an excess profits tax, the government bein~ 
of the opinion that such profits should be used to defray 
(:.expendi ture caused to the State by the war. 43 For instance all 
profits on the sale of gold over 150 shillings per fine ounce 
were appropriated. 44 
The Emergency Regulations had prohibited any trade with 
enemy countries, and since South Africa had hitherto been 
conducting a considerable amount of trade with Germany, this 
naturally had an effect on the economy. In Cape Town alone, 
several South African fims holding German agencies were unable 
to obtain payment for German goods from the sale of which they 
had anticipated returns. German businesses throughout the 
country were doing badly and some firms were forced to close 
down altogether. However some business organizations found a 
way around the Emergency Regulations by conducting business 
through neutral countries. At the end of October, German goods 
were still filtering through.45 
41. Cape lrgus, 4 October, 1939, p. 5. 
42. Vaderland, 6 October, 1939, p. 7. 
43. Cape ArguS, 22 September, 1939, p. 12. 
44. Cape ArguS, 4 October, 1939, p. 12. 











It can be seen that no serious economic dislocation 
resulted from the Union's changed circumstances. Some 
employees were discharged despite the provision forbidding this 
in the Emergency Regulations, but this was not widespread, and 
such cases as there were, were investigated. 
An interesting effect of war psychology even in these 
early months, was the marked increase in the number of marriages 
which took place. The newspapers commented on the fact that 
divor~e applications decreased. Even contestants in civil suits 
seemed to be more conciliatory. On October 5 the Cape Argus 
noted that "the rolls of the civil court are shorter than they 
have been for a very long time." Many settlemants were reached 
out of court. Generous instincts too were responsible for the 
nation-wide fund scheme launched by the Mayor of Johannesburg, 
Mr. J.J. Page, to buy surplus foodstuffs and send them to the 
Allies overseas. 46 The goal for the fund was set at £1,000,000, I 
and in October the government decided to give the scheme its 
official support, whereupon it was optimistically speculated that 
the £1 million mark would be improved upon. 47 
This Mayors' Fund attracted considerable attention 
throughout the country, as it was planned on such a large scale, 
however there were those whose opinions concerning it were far 
from favourable. It so happened that while the fund was 
featuring largely in the news there was a rash of demonstrations 
by the unemployed. For instance, on October 18, a procession 
of jobless men half a mile long marched through the streets of 
Johannesburg. 48 In some Nationalist circles there were 
complaints that the st_rving and unemployed of South Africa 
should be attended to before there was any thought of giving aid 
to countries abDoad. 
Since South Africa's decision on September 4 to 
participate in the war, there had been an intensification of the 
propaganda broadcast by Zeesen Radio. The programmes continued 
to exploit such inflammable material as the sufferings of the 
Boer War, coupled with fictitious reports of atrocities in the 
intermnelit camps. In a series called "Lest We Forget", women, 
speaking in Afrikaans, told harrowing tales of conditions during 
the Boer War. After a particularly lachrymose broadcast one 
46. Rand Daily Mail, 20 September, 1939, p. 9. 
47. Vaderland, 17 October, 1939, p. 1. 














night, the Ca.pe Argus reported acidly: "The withers were 
wrung last night from a performance of Schumann's 'Traumerai' 
to heighten the drama of the words. n49 In addition to this 
type of propaganda, a news service was provided which 
specialized in broadcasting imaginary accounts of British defeats 
in naval engagements. On September 23, for instance, there was 
axLannouncement that His Majesty's battle cruisers, "Hood", 
"Renown" and "Repulse" hhl been destroyed by German submarines 
in the Mediterranean. Such an event had not taken place. 50 
In the middle of September a new German station, 
broadcasting from Hamburg, appeared on the air. Although no 
attempt was made by the South African Government to jam the 
German wavelengths, it was considered necessary to institute 
counter-propaganda on the domestic radio. This task was to 
, 
,,' 
fall to the South African Broadcasting Corporation, ac~ing in 
conjunction with the Bureau of Information. Within the ~.A.b.C.1 
itself there was strife because of the dirferent attitudes of 
employees towards ~outh Africa'S war policy. In fact there was 
a weeaing-out of the more obstreperous anti-government elements 
before the institution of a nightly programme aimed at 
nullifying the propaganda emanating rrom Germany. 51 On October 
16, a "Union Unity Furid" was launched in Johannesburg by Sir 
Oharles Rey, former Resident Commissioner of Bechuanaland. The ! 
aim was to raise money for the printing of thousands of 
pamphlets, Ior lecture tours, and Ior the development of loyal 
Afrikaans-medium newspapers, in an all-out attempt to combat 
Nazi propaganda. 52 This was done with the approval of the 
government. Neutrality supporters were contemptuous of these 
efforts as can be seen by General Kamp's words on the subject: , 
;iNog die politieke radiopraaitjie van die Imperialistiese 
Regering, nog die Imperialiste se £ miljoen kosfonds, nog hulle 
£200,000 propaganda skema sal daarin slaag om die volk van sy 
koers te bring. u53 
Apart Irom the preservation of order, the government's 
most vital task Was the reorganiz~tion of the Detence System. 
49. Oa]2e Ar~s, 19 September, 1939, p. 13. 
50. Ca]2e Argus, 24 September, 1939, p. 18. 
51. Vide Forum, 16 September, 1939, Vol. II, No. L5, p. 1, and 
G.H. Calpin, There t:t.re no ~outh africans, p. 332. 
52. Keesin~'s contem~orary Archives, 1937 - 1940, p. 3781. 











It was not so much a case of reorganization as of creation, for 
in 1939 South Africa's defences were practically non-existent. 
Oswald Pirow, the former Defence Minister, not unnaturally 
became the butt of much hostile criticism. In fairness it must 
be said ~ha~ the blame was not Pirow's alone. He haa drawn up 
plans involving a large-scale reorganization and increase in the 
country's derences, but these were never put into practice, 
partly becouse of the rather complacent atti~ude of the 
government and partly because, in a period of prosperity, South 
Africans were unwilling to diver~ any money from economic enuer-
prizes to military prepar~tions. 
Pirow had what amounted to an obse~sion about bushveld 
warfare. He had always maintained that any threat to South 
Africa would come overland from the North rather than via the 
country's coasts. This attitude was probably governed by the 
fear of a Black/White confrontation. It was Pirow's zeal for 
mobile defence which led him, in the age of the bomber and the 
armoured car, to the invention of that ro~ling anachronism, the 
ousheart. These vehicles, drawn by oxen, were considered by 
Pirow to be the ideal means of transporting ammunition and 
supplies across the veld, because they were relatively light and 
would be a difficult target to bomb from the air. With great 
solemnity the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Pierre van 
Ryneveldt, had accompanied Mr. Pirow to the Letaba ~rea on 
AUgust 8 to test the bushcarts in manoeuvres. Betraying nary 
a trace of irony, the Hand Daily Mail hailed the expedition as 
"one 01' the most important experiments yet conducted in South 
African military manoeuvres". In spite of runaway oxen and 
broken axles, Pirow declared himself perfectly satisfied with his 
bushcarts. There were those who wished that he had devoted 
himself to more pressing defence problems. 
Pirow's original defence programme had provided for a 
standing army of 137,000 men, which could be increased to 
150,000 should the need arise. Much emphaSis was placed on the 
proposed training of mobile bush batallions. £5,000,000 was 
actually appropriated for defence purposes, to be spread out 
over the period 1938 - 1941. Pirow, on his tour abroad, 
endeavoured to buy,~ armaments, but found that British 
manufacturers were too busy fulfilling their own country's 
. , 
,I • 
demands to contemplate an order for South Africa. 54 Thus it was, 











that when war broke out, none of Pirow's plans had materialized, 
and South Africa was militarily naked. She had six modern 
aeroplanes, consisting of four Hurricane fighters, a Fairey 
Battle bomber and a Blenheim bomber and sixty-three outdated 
Hartbeests and Furies. 55 Smuts immediatley set about procuring 
eighteen Junker 86 and eleven Junker 52 aircraft from the South 
African Airways. These were modified to carry machine-guns and 
bombs and were used for troop-carrying and coastal defence. 
S,ea patrols were organized as soon as the aircraft were 
operational. The Cape Town air squadroa was given the task of 
escorting warships in past the approaches to the harbour, and of 
investigating reports of submarine activity. The patrol flew 
out as far as 140 miles south of Cape Point. 56 The government 
also erganized a pupil pilot scheme to swell the ranks of' 
trained pilots in the Air Force. Those applicants who did not 
fulfil the requirements set by an examining bo.rd, were 
encouraged to join the Air Force as observers, bomb-aimers and 
gunners. 57 The South African Air Force saw action for the 
first time on December 2, 1939, when a squadron intercepted the 
Deutsche Ost-Afrika liner "Watussi." Rather than surrender, the 
commanding officer scuttled the ShiP.58 
Coastal defence at the time of the outbreak of war was 
rudimentary, each of the three major ports having two guns of 
I 
" 
5 or 6 inch diameter. These were mounted on field carriages and 
would have been about as effective as pop-guns in a naval 
engagement. South Africa in 1939 did not posess a navy of her 
own except for two mine-sweeping trawlers, a survey Ship, and a 
training ship, the "General Botha," stationed at Simonstown. 
Smuts arranged for the conversion of additional trawlers and 
whalers into mine-sweepers and deployed men from the Royal Navy 
Volunteer Reserve division stationed in South Africa, to man the 
coastal guns.59 Smuts had moulded these different elements into 
the Seaward Defence Force by the middle of October. 60 South 
Africats meagre naval resources were augmented by the arrival in 
September of two British ships, the tlErebus" and the "Danae." 
~ __ ~~~ __ ~~~ __ ~~~ ____ ~ __ ~-= __ ~ __ ~ ____________ ~ ____ ~,i 
54. Vide G.R. Calpin, There Are No South Africans, pp. 350 - 357. 
55. L.O.F. Turner, H.R. Gordon-Cumming and J .E. Betzler, War in ,I. 
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The former was on loan from the Royal Navy on a semi-permanent 
basis, while the latter had been detached from the Reserve Fleet 
and was armed with six eight-inch guns.6l 
When b)nuts took mattera in hand, the South African army, 
including both the Permanent and the Active Citizen Force, 
amounted to just under 20,000 men. As Smuts had indicated 
earlier, enlistment was on a voluntary basis, and there was an 
immediate rush to serve. Those who volunteered ror service 
elsewhere in Arrica (it transpired that when Smuts had said 
troops would not be sent overseas, he had not considered the 
continene of Africa as overseas) were given an orange flash on 
each shoulder. No~one who volunteered wanted to be considered 
cowardly or disloyal and shortly nearly all the men in service 
were wearing them. The whole idea of the urooi lussies" was yet 
another of Smuts's shrewd moves. 62 
Many women were manifestly eager to partiCipate in the w~ 
effort. The day after war was declared, 3,000 enthusiastic 
women attended a meeting of the Women's National Service Legion 
in the City Hall in Cape Town, and by September 15, 7,000 had 
enrolled in the organization. 63 The South African Women's 
Aviation Association which had been founded in December 1938, 
was militarized, becoming the Women's Auxiliary Air ~orce, and 
its members did valuable service as mechaniCS and ground 
personnel. 64 Orfers of help came from such diverse quarters as 
the Motor Lorry Dri er's Union and the South African amateur 
radio system. 65 Municipalities throughout the country 
volunteered to help the government in its civil defence 
arrangements. In fact so many people volunteered for service of 
different kinds that Colonel Reitz, the Deputy Prime Minister 
issued a statement on September 14, saying: ",Do not be 
impatient. In time every man and woman will be given an 
opportunity to serve. n66 
One must not imagine that all political differences 
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stood aloof from enlistment. There had been concern over the 
possible reaction of the Union's Burgher commandos. However 
when approached by the Commandant-in-chief Lieutenant-General 
A.J.E. Brink, all the commandos promised to support the governme~ 
in spite or political differences. 67 Smuts also iniated a drive 
against politics in the Union Defence Force by a proclamation 
authorizing the discharge of any member who engaged in political 
activities. 68 
On September 28, the Defence Force announced ~he 
establishment of an Essential Servioes Protection Corps whose 
d~ties would entail the guarding of military installations, oil 
supplies, magazines, power stations and reservoirs. This was an 
effort to supplement the Police Force which had been under 
considerable strain since the outbreak of war. 69 
As has been mentioned before, there were German 
and other refugees who were anxious to serve on the same ~erms 
as South African soldiers. This desire was recognized in an 
official proclamation of October 29, which provided for the 
creation of a u1!oreign Legion". Very soon applica~ions were 
being received rrom German, Czech and Aus~rian refugees. 70 
At the outset of war the Union's supplies of munitions 
were negligible. arrangements were made for the construction 
of a Munitions factory in Pretoria and Denys Reitz, while 
attending the London Conference called by Mr. Chamberlain for 
discussions on common defence, set about purchasing the 
machinery to make the ractory operational. 71 
Undoubtedly ~~uts and the Defence Department achieved a 
great deal in a v~ry sho~ time, in providing ade,uate security 
for the country. AS the war progressed South African 
involvement increased. In all, by the end of the w~r 345,000 
South Africans had enlisted on a full-time oasis. The Union's 
contribution to the w~r erfort, while perhaps not as grea~ as 
some of ~he Dominions', was nevertheless very creditable in view 
of the heterogeneous character of the country. 
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As has been intimated, the decision for participation in 
the war produced an intensification of the frenetic political 
activity which had pervaded the South African scene in the pre-
war months. It became apparent that there was to be no resort 
to violence by the dissentient elements, but it was also clear 
that the Opposition intended to fight Parliament's decision with 
every constitutional means at its disposal. Supporters of 
Hertzog and Smuts contended in the political arena with 
undiminished energy, and recriminations were a feature of the war 
of words and ideas which raged. Parliament had been prorogued, 
which meant that antagonists battled in the Press rather than in 
personal confrontations in the House of Assembly. For the 
remainder of 1939 Smuts governed by proclamation. He could have 
summoned Parliament earlier than January, 1940, but chose not to 
do so. There was a calculated risk involved, for the steps 
which he took would sooner or later have to be sanctioned 
retrogressively by Parliament. However the advantages of the 
situation were that Smuts could, in the interim, give attention 
to the preSSing needs of Defence and also consolidate the domestic 
situation before facing the antagonistic legislative proposals 
which the Opposition was bound to sponsor. 
On Sep~ember 12, Smuts issued an appeal to the nation for 
tolerance and constructive behaviour. His words demonstrated hie 
grasp of the acute political realities of the grave divisioh of 
opinion in the country. He made no attempt to by-pass the fact 
that a serious breach had taken place, but requested the country 
to make the best of the situation. 
"However complete the wreck of the United Party, 
(Smuts said) I am deeply anxious that as much as 
possible of the spirit of Fusion should be kept 
alive and that we shall never go back again to the 
bad and bitter old days of the party fight preceding 
Fusion. Let us save as much as possible out of the 
wreck. "72 
Hertzog had also issued an appeal to the people of South 
Africa, but it was of a different kind, the only points of 
similarity being the recognition of the split in the United Party 
and a plea for strictly constitutional behaviour. In an open 
letter on September 6 beginning: "Dear fellow South Africans, 
sons and daughters of South Africa," Hertzog explained his 
attitude in the criSis, and his view of General Smuts's stand. 
That he did not consider the matter as a closed and irreversible 
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chapter can be seen by the following: 
"It must be clear to all that only by the most 
determined action on the part of all patriotic 
Afrikaners, English-speaking as well as Afrikaans-
speaking, can freedom be maintained and can we be 
prevented from being dragged even deeper into the 
war. "73 
Hertzog was to maintain consistent opposition to South Africa's 
participation in the war, even proposing a resolution in 
Parliament on 23 January, 1940 to the effect that "this House 
is of the opinion that the time has arrived when the war with 
Germany should be ended and that peace be restored.,,74 The 
motion was defeated. 
Amidst the storm of criticism levelled at him, Smuts 
made a personal reply to only one accusation. In a speech at 
Lydenburg on September 15, Oswald Pirow had devoted some time to 
allegations that Smuts had definitely accepted a policy of 
neutrali ty under all circumstances in September 1938 and that his 
present attitude must be attributable to a grievous lack of 
candour on his part. This matter had received an airing in the 
Parliamentary debate on September 4, but apparently Smuts felt 
that clarification was necessary, and on September 16 issued an 
official statement repudiating Pirow's charge as a 
misrepresentation of the facts. 75 Smuts's supporters also took 
up the cudgels on his behalf, Harry Lawrence being particularly 
emphatic in his rejection of Pirow's interpretation of the matter. 
If Smuts had replied to all the criticisms directed at 
him, the work of ~he government would have come to a grinding 
halt. "He has trodden in blood across the pages of South 
African History," said Dr. Malan on September 26. 76 General 
Kemp concentrated his attack on Smuts's so-called "Imperialism", 
while others berated him for what they felt was irreparable 
damage to any prospect of unity in South Africa. Some were more 
temperate in their attitudes., For instance, H.A. Fagan, M.P. 
for Stellenbosch, in a speech at Van Rhynsdorp on September 30, 
expressed his regret that old friends had had to divide into 
separate camps, and said that although he personally had the 
greatest admiration for the members of the present cabinet, he 
could not agree with their policy.77 
74. Hancock, Smuts, Vol. II, p. 337. 
75. Cape ArguS, 16 September, 1939, p. 15. 
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Some members of the English-speaking section continued 
to rail indiscriminately at Hertzogites and Malanites, calling 
them Nazis and cowards. These accusations met with vehement 
d~nials. During the course of the Transvaal National Party 
Congress in Pretoria in late September, for example, there was 
an indignant and categoric rejection of the charges of Nazi 
leanings,78 although some extreme Nationalists still attempted 
justifications of Hitler's policy. An entry from ~.A.L. 
Green t s war diary i"or November 28, states: 
til hear that among the more.BQderate section of 
the Nationalists feeling against the pro-German 
line taken by extremists is on the increase. One 
man said the other day: 'I am heart and soul for 
neutrality, but I strongly object to being identified 
wi th pro-Nazism. ' tt 
Allover the country there were meetings of various 
branches of the political parties, at which resolutions were 
passed either sanctioning or condemning Parliament's decision. 
The Afrikaans universities of Pretoria and Stellenbosch held 
mass meetings to protest against the government's policy. 
This was a time or insult and injury, but there were 
pleasanter sides to it in the form of accolades for both Hertzog 
and Smuts from different quarters. By September 7 both had 
received approximately 700 telegrams expressing approval of 
their respec~ive stands. 79 These and other protestations are 
too numerous for reproduction here, but perhaps it might-be 
interesting to pause and consider the reaction of the Africans, 
since although comprising ~he vast majority of the country's 
population, they had mutely watched the evolution of a crisis 
which would affect their destiny too. The three Native 
Representatives in Parliament had cast their votes for Smuts, 
and judging by the messages received from African authorities 
themselves, this action was endorsed by the African population. 
The President-General of the African National Congress Mr. Z.R. 
Mahabane, sent the following message to Mrs. Margaret Ballinger: 
ttl think I am voicing the feelings and views of the 
African people when I say that our representatives 
have again correctly interpreted the fellings of their 
constituents in vo~ing for General Smuts's amendment 
on the neutrality issue. Please tell General Smuts 
that we highly appreCiate the manly and honourable stand 
he has always taken. It is prOvidential that in a . 
crisis like this a man of his calibre and insight into 
affairs should oe at the head of state. n 80 
78. Rand Daily Mail, 29 September, 1939, p. 10. 
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Another expression of loyalty from the Africans was sent to the 
Minis,ter of Native A!·fairs by Mr. Simpson Bhengu, President of 
the Association of Native Location Advisory Boards in Natal. 
He asked the Minister to convey to Smuts "our deep 0nd sincere 
loyalty in this time of crisis, and the assurance that we natives 
of Natal fervently desire that the government will allow us to 
contribute in whatever manner we can to the national service of 
our country, together with our European fellow citizens. 1I81 
Similar affirmations of loyalty were received from all the 
tribal chiefs in the Newcastle area and from the African 
Ethiopian Church representing 12,000 members there. 82 
The strife within the United Party during September and 
October is an interesting aspect of the reactions to the decision 
on September 4. On September 15 the Executive Committee of ~he 
United Party in the Cape voted by Nineteen votes to four in 
favour of ~eneral Smuts's policy. The following day the Orange 
Free State Head Committee voted in support of General Hertzog by 
twenty-four votes to three. 83 Natal of course voted solidly for 
Smuts, but in the Transvaal a curious situation arose. ~he Head 
Committee voted 26 to 16 in favour of General Hertzog, but this 
was apparently not a true reflection of United Party sentiment 
in the Transvaal, because in the debate of September 4, 32 out 
of 59 Transvaal members of the United Party had voted for ~eneral 
Smuts's amendment. 84 The answer to the riddle lay in the 
unequal proportional representation of members from various 
districts on the Head COIT~ittee. For administrative purposes 
the Transvaal was divided up into five areas, the Rand, Pretoria, 
and three country districts. EaCh of the districts had equal 
representation on the Head Committee, although the Rand elected 
nearly as many members to Parliament as the other four districts 
combined. So the Rand's representation on the Head COIDnlittee 
was much smaller than it should have been. A struggle ensu~d, 
as the Witwatersrand Executive, which was the Party's official 
mouthpiece, would not accept the Head Committee's decision, 
while the Head Committee repudiated the Witwatersrand's claim to 
speak for the party.85 In the final analysis the conflict in thE 
.. 
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Transvaal United Party did not matter because the Smutsite wing 
gained hegemony, but there was much confusion as Hertzog's 
supporters separated themselves from Snmts's and set up 
independent Hertzogite branches of the United Party. For 
instance the Calvinia constituency passed a vote of no confidence 
in their representative, Dr. Steenkamp, because they disagreed 
with his support of Smuts in the Parliamentary debate. 86 A 
Hertzog supporter who found himself in trouble with his 
constituents was Mr. N.J. Schoeman, whose Lydenburg constituency 
voted in favour of General Smuts's policy in spite of the fact 
that Mr. Schoeman had voted for Hertzog in Parliament. 87 
The right to the official title of the United Party was 
fiercely disputed between Smuts's and Hertzog's supporters. 
Eventually it was decided to hold a national United Party 
Conference in Bloemfontein in November to settle the points at 
issue. On November 2 the Central Head Committee passed a 
resolution approving the government's war policy by 28 votes to 
18 whereupon General Hertzog relinquished his chairmanship and 
left the conference, followed by his supporters. Smuts was then 
elected chairman and by a unanimous vote the Hertzogites were 
removed from the United Party rolls. However Hertzog was not 
yet in the political wilderness, for in the interim the Malanites 
had been courting him, and there was a conference scheduled 
later that month with a possible rapprochement in view. In the 
meanwhile the Hertzogites styled themselves "the Hertzog group 
of the United Party.tltm 
From the moment that Hertzog had proposed his neutrality 
amendment, a tremendous current of optimism had swept the ranks 
of Afrikaners throughout the country. The hour for a complete 
and satisfying reunion and an end to the "broedertwis tl seemed 
to be at hand. Across the gulf which had separated them since 
the inception of FuSion, Afrikaner called to Afrikaner in the 
hope that the distance could at last be bridged. For this was 
not merely a matter of an expedient political arrangement - it 
was also an opportunity for a spiritual and emotional healing of 
what was felt to have been an unnatural division in the first 
place. Hertzog was right when he said in reference to the crisis. 
which had occurred: "There is no doubt that few other things 
could so quickly or effectively have consolidated Afrikaans-
speaking Afrikanerdom.,,89 
86. CaFe Argus, 12 September, 1939, p. 12. 
87. Rand Daily Mail, 22 September, 1939, p. lO. 
58. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1937 - 1940, p. 3814. 






















Suddenly Hertzog was a hero to his people. He would 
not have been human if the unaccustomed paeans of the Malanites 
had not moved him. When he left for the North on September 6, 
crowds of supporters assembled at Cape Town station to cheer him 
on his way. A Union flag was draped around his shoulders and he 
was borne aloft on willing shoulders to his carriage. 90 The 
fervent emotional tide had not abated when a vast crowd of 
50,000 gathered at the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria on 
September 8 for a symbolic healing ceremony. Hertzog was 
acclaimed in fulsome words of praise: "From the depths of the L 
Afrikaner heart and soul we thank you, who have never been false 
to your nation. The nation you made and led clasps you to its 
bosom. We are jealous of you, General, and will not yield to 
any other nation." they said. 91 
In spite of the undoubted sincerity of this demonstration 
and heartfelt as the desire for unity was, it was to& much to 
expect that hereniging could become an actuality simplY by 
virtue of protestations of goodwill. Fundamental differences 
still existed between Hertzog and Malan and these would have to 
be reconciled before any merger took place. Hertzog had time 
and again emphasized the need for racial harmony between the 
two white groups in South Africa. Neither section must be 
forced into subservience by the other. Instead there should be 
a mutual striving towards the combined progress of the country. 
This did not accord with the Malanites view of the situation. 
To them, the Eng:Lish-speaking section had finally demonstrated 
its unwillingness to. suomerge its British identity.in patriotic 
South Africanism. Henceforward the English-speaking ~outh 
African would only be accepted on the Afrikaners own terms, or 
not at all. Afrikaners themselves in order to be accepted 
would hav. to subscribe to exclusively Nationalist prinCiples. 
Even at the Voortrekker Monument meeting there were disquieting 
indications that all was not well. Some of those present felt 
that Hertzog's speech, conservative as it was in some respects, 
was over-solicitous of the interests of English-speaking South 
Africans, while Hertzog must have been disturbed by the 
racialistic implications of the Johannes ~ourie incident. 
During the course of the pero~ations b'ourie, the brother of Jopie 
b'ourie who had been executed X"or his part in the 1914 rebelliong2 ' 
was carried to the platform on the shoulders of exultant students. 
90. Cape Argus, 7 September, 1939, p. 12. 
91. O.M. van den Heever, ueneral J.B.M. Hertzog, p. 284. 











This did not conform at all to the spirit of moderation ~d 
constitutionality which Hertzog was endeavouring to inculcate 
in his people. 
Another potential source of trouhle between Malan and 
Hertzog was the Republican issue. The for.mer, under constant 
pressure from his supporters, was in favour of a change to a 
Republican rorm of government as soon as was possible, regardless 
of the opposition of the ~nglish-speaking section. Hertzog 
agreed that an eventual Hepublic was desirable but he saw it in 
terms of a gradual evolution, in the process of which the English 
speaking South African would become mellowed enough to support 
a Hepublican government of his own volition. However these 
basic conflicts of opinion had not yet been brought up for 
simultaneous scrutiny, and the two men were still caught up in 
the emotional vortex of toenadering. 
The honeymoon period was to be of short duration. In 
late September Vr. Malan's speeches were still expressive of 
buoyant optimism. "The new day of Afrikanerdom is dawning. 
If arrikanerdom goes forward as one, I uell you there is no 
great problem in this country that cannot be solved," he told 
the Transvaal National Party congress on September 27. 93 B,y 
October the bloom was beginning to rub off. The Federal uouncil 
of the Nationalist Party issued a list of provisos concerning the 
forthcoming Hereniging Conference in Pretoria, which showed uhat 
after the first flush of enthusiasm:, a more c€l.utious note had 
crept back into the movement for unity. The statement made it 
abundantly clear that although hereniging was desirable, it 
could only be achieved "me1i die verstande ewewel dat dit as 'n :._ 
noodsaaklike grondslag van die onderhandelings vir In politieke 
eenheid moet wees: dat die naam Nasionale Party oehou moet 
word en dat by die formulering van beginsels daar geen 
verswakking sal wees van die omskrewe beginsels van die 
Nasionale Party insake die groot lewensvrl:2.agstukke nie. u94 In 
other words, the Malanites would brook no compromise on 
Republicanism or acceptance by English-speaking South Africans 
of ftfrikaner ideals. Hertzog on the other hand continued to 
consider the English-speaking section in his speeches on the 
93. 0ape ftrgus, 27 September, 1939, p. 16. 











future of South Africa, and intimated that he was opposed to an 
abrupt severance of South Africa's ties with the Commonwealth, 
an attitude which was noted with anxiety and the oeginnings of 
disi+lusionment by the Malanites. 
The two wings of Afrikanerdom met in Pretoria on 
November 23, 1939. There was still considerahLe goodwill in 
evidence, but it rapidly became apparent ~hat common hostility 
towards war was not an adequate coagulant. Discussions ranged 
over a wide fie-ld. A consideration of some significance was 
the' ~'" that only a short time before, members of the two groups 
had been indulging in heated rhetoric at each other's expense, 
and it was virtually impossible to erase completely the memory 
of the insults exchanged. The stumbling-block upon which the 
conference broke down was the Repu,blican issue. 95 An 
exposition of the protracted negotiations which ensued between 
Malanites and Hertzogites lies outside the range of this essay. 
Suffice it to say that although hereniging did come about in 
1940, the halcyon days were of brief duration and General 
Hertzog retired from political life. He spent his remaining 
days on his farm, brooding upon the wreckage of his hopes and 
followihg the progress of the war with obsessive attention, 
tracing it out on the charts in his study.96 
General Smuts was concentrating all his energies on a 
limited objective for the moment, i.e. the war situation. He 
was encouraged by favourable returns in November by-elections 
and the fact that the Emergency Regulations had been accepted 
without serious disruption resulting. He continued on his 
course, secure in his belief that he had made the right decision 
for his country. Subsequent history has vindicated this belief. 
95. Roberts and Trollip, The South. African OpPOSition, 1939-1945, 
p. 19. 
96. From information supplied by Mr. D. Spies, who was an 
intimate of Hertzogts for many years, having served under 











Politics in South Africa is a peculiarly fascinating 
study, because of the diverse racial composition of the country. 
As long as South Africans continue to maintain a deliberate 
separation of identities in conjunction with bitter memories, 
the question of unity will always be a pressing problem. 
South Africa's decision to participate in the Second World War 
forms one small part of a history of conflicting political 
ideologies • 
. ~ The neutrality iSsu's acid test laid bare the 
divisions which still existed beneath the surface. In the 
process the co-operative amity of the Fusion movement was 
cancelled and there ensued an intensification of political 
antagonism. Although in a general sense the decision on 
September 4, 1939 was a catalyst making for racial division, it 
was also the harbinger of an ephemeral Afrikaner unity. 
Isolationism and parochialism had played a part in the 
story, but South Africa was not alone in these negative qualities 
She shared them with a country as advanced and powerful as the 
United States of America. 
General Smuts had not enjoyed an unblemished political 
career, as the Witwatersrand crisis of 1922 and the 
Bondelzwarts affair will testify, but in 1939 he handled a 
critical situation in a calm and confident manner and had the 
satisfaction of seeing his convictions about South African 
participation in the war put to the test and proven. Smuts, 
unlike Hertzog, was to enjoy political dominance for a further 
decade. For Hertzog 1939 was almost the end of the road. 
After the failure of hereniging he retired from the contest, 
broken and aged. His contribution to the evolution of the 
country was denied while the English-speaking prejudice 
generated by his neutrality stand and the disillusionment of 
Afrikaners over the abortive attempts at hereniging lasted. 
But he has since emerged from his lapse into obscurity as 
perspective has shed a more kindly light on his career as a 
whole, and both Afrikaans and English-speaking ~outh Africans 
have claimed him for their own. 
Dr. Malan was to carry o:tf the victor's laurels in the 
General Election of 1948. Significantly, his accession to 
power saw a considerable softening of the anti-British and anti-
Semitic overtones which had hitherto been so much a part of his 
public image. This seems to suggest that these were in part 
simply political weapons to be discarded once they were no longer 
necessary. In late 1939 and the early part of 1940, it was 











Hitler's auspices. If he did flirt with Nazidom, this 
tendency disappeared along with the Nazis themselves. 
As this essay has shown, the errects on South Africa of 
entry into the war were not nearly so dire as had been predicted, 
in that there was no civil war. The country remained relatively 
calm. In South Africa frene~ic political activity is the norm 
rather than the exception, so it was not surprising that this 
activity continued after the decision. This is not to 
deprecate the importance of the wrecking of the buaion 
government and the realignment of the political parties, but ~o 
suggest that repercussions could have oeen a great deal worse 
than they were. This of course does not take into consideration 
the long-term effects of the crisis in ~eptember 1939 which lie 










COMMENT ON SOUHCES. 
This topic has been a most interesting one, but it has 
also been at times frustrating, owing to the unavailability of 
much primary material, ego the Smuts, Hertzog and Havenga 
papers, the Prime Minister's official records and relevant 
sections of the Morris Alexander papers. This has led to a 
heavy reliance on newspapers and perioaicals in chapters one and 
fou.r. 
W.K. Hancock's biography of General Smuts has been 
invaluable for an insight into 0mui;s's thoughts during this 
period. It is regrettable that a similarly authoritative work 
has not yet been written about General Hertzog, the two existing 
biographies, although interesting, being of dubious historical 
value. 
There is a paucity of recent, published material on the 
1939 neutrality criSiS, although a large number of books were 
written onr;he su"bject during, or just after the war. Many of 
the writers were still under the influence of the partisan 
emotions geneL"ated by the War and this has occasioned 
considerable concentration upon checking the validity of 
references and guaging the extent of exaggeration. As these 
books were not written by historians, inaae~uate footnoting 
presented an aaditional difficulty in cross-checking 
ret"erences. 
In contra.st, Hansard's Union House of Assembly Debates 
were very valuable, particularly for the neutrality debG~e of 
September 4, by virtue of the verbatim speeches produced in 
entirety and without misleading interpretation. The factual 
reports of South fifrican events in Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives were also useful in this connection. 
The 1939 issues of the Round Table provided a useful 
summary of the South A:t'rican scene, while the Hertzog - Annale, 
although mainly eulogistic, yielded interesting pieces of 
information ooncerning Hertzog's behaviour immediately after his 
defeat in Parliament. 
The South African Opposi tiO_J?..1. __ !~)_~ :-__ ~945, by lJI. Roberts 
and A.E.G. Trollip, was valuable for the account given of the 
Hereniging negotiations between the Hertzogites and the Malanites 
and also for suggesting additional sources. 
Mr. Harry Lawrence's article in the Sunday Times, 2 
August, 1964, contains to date the most comprehensive account of 
the cabinet meetings of September 2 and 3. It was unfortunate 
that Mr. Lawrence was overseas at the stage of research when an 











to be seen whether some of the less prominent Cabinet Ministers 
eg. Fagan, Sturrock and Clarkson, have left their written 
impressions. 
An official Union War History (Military and Civil) was 
commenced, but the project was terminated by the Nationalist 
Government after three volumes had been published. Research 
was undertaken on the civil side, but not brought to finality. 
The Union War History files were transferred to the custody of 
the Government Archives. 
This essay is concluded in the knowledge that much 
research still remains to be done on the subject if and when 
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